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I. Introduction
Academicfreedom andreligiousfreedom have one root in common:
both are based upon thefreedom of conscience, hence neither can2
flourish in a community that has no respectforhuman individuality.
In 1990, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) added sexual
orientation to its nondiscrimination policy, setting the stage for a battle between
America's law schools and the United States military.3 Members of AALS
must conform to this nondiscrimination policy, which prohibits law schools
from assisting recruiters who screen student applicants by their sexual
orientation.4 The military's "Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy" brings Judge
Advocate General (JAG) recruiters under this ban.' Alarmed by law schools'
attempts to deny JAG officers access to the career services offered to other legal
2.

RIcHARD HOFSTADTER, AcADEMIc FREEDOM INTHE AGE OF THE COLLEGE 62 (1996).
3. See Brief for the Association of American Law Schools at 4, as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006) (No. 04-1152) ("[Tlhe AALS House of Representatives voted unanimously to amend the
AALS Bylaws in 1990 to include sexual orientation in the nondiscrimination policy.").
Documents related to the FAIR v. Rumsfeld case are available at http://www.law.george
town.edu/solomon/FAIRvRUMSFELD.html.
4. See Brief for the Association of American Law Schools at 2, as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2004) (No. 03-4433) ("The AALS and its member schools believe so strongly in the value of
non-discrimination that they have adopted a rule that failure to comply with this mandate, absent
any exemptions, results in a loss of AALS membership.").
5. See Abigail K. Holland, Note, The High Price ofEquality: The Effect ofthe Solomon
Amendment on Law Schools 'First Amendment Rights, 38 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 855,870 (2005)
("Due to the military's 'Don't Ask Don't Tell' policy regarding homosexuals in the military, law
schools have refused to subsidize the military's on-campus recruitment efforts.").
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employers, Congress passed legislation, known as the Solomon Amendment, to
remedy this perceived discrimination against military recruiters.6
The Solomon Amendment denies federal funds to universities that refuse
to provide military recruiters the same access to students and career services
that they grant to other employers.7 Covering funding from a wide range of
government entities, the Solomon Amendment may cost universities a
significant amount of federal money. 8 Agencies covered by the Solomon
Amendment include the Departments of Defense, Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education, Homeland Security, and Transportation. 9 If any part of a
university, such as a law school, fails to provide military recruiters the access
and services it provides to other employers, the entire university becomes
ineligible to receive these federal funds.' °
On September 19, 2003, the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights
(FAIR), the Society for American Law Teachers (SALT), and several
individual plaintiffs filed suit against Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
and other government officials, seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment." FAIR is "an association of 36 law
schools and law faculties whose mission is to promote academic freedom and to
support educational institutions [in] opposing discrimination."' 2 FAIR's
membership consists of twelve institutions, half of which are public, and
twenty-four faculties, only six of which are private.' 3 Public law schools or
6. See Brief for Congressman Richard Pombo et al. at 11, as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 041152) ("The military requires the 'best and the brightest' for each of its occupation
specialties... because these missions implicate life or death situations.... If Respondents

succeed, equal access will be denied to 92 percent of law graduates currently attending
American Association of Law School member institutions.")
7. See Paul M. Smith et al., Courtside, 23 COMM. LAw. 23, 24 (Spring 2005) ("[Tlhe
Solomon Amendment denies federal funds to any institution of higher education that does not
provide military recruiters with access to its campus and students on par with the access
available to other employers.").
8. See id. (stating that the Solomon Amendment could cost universities "hundreds of
millions of dollars in federal funds").
9. See id. (listing the governmental funding targeted by the Solomon Amendment).
10. See id. (noting that the Solomon Amendment "penalizes a parent university for the
actions of any of its subelements, such as its law school").
11. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Summary of FAIR's Litigation,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/FAIRsummary.html (last visited June 4, 2006)
(describing FAIR's litigation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, JoinFAIR, http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/solomon/joinFAIR.html (last visited June 4, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
13. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, FAIR ParticipatingLaw Schools,
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their faculties thus compose two-thirds of FAIR's membership. The law
schools claimed that the Solomon Amendment violated their First Amendment
rights of academic freedom, freedom of speech, and freedom of expressive
association.14 They also claimed that the Solomon Amendment violates the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the First Amendment prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine."
Judge John Lifland of the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey denied FAIR's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding it
unlikely that FAIR's constitutional claims would succeed.1 6 Judge Lifland
viewed academic freedom as a parasitic doctrine that is "not cognizable without
a foundational free speech or associational right."' 7 Because he found no
violation of FAIR's free speech or associational freedoms, Judge Lifland
ignored FAIR's academic freedom claims. 18
On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit granted FAIR a
preliminary injunction.19 Judge Thomas Ambro's opinion focuses on the law
schools' free speech and associational rights, characterizing the Solomon
Amendment as an unconstitutional condition that forces law schools to adopt a
message incompatible with their "educational objectives."2 ° The Third Circuit
referred to academic freedom in a footnote merely to emphasize the importance

http://www.law.georgetown.edu/Solomon/participatingschools.htmi (last visited June 4,2006)
(listing the members of FAIR who are willing to be named publicly and giving the total number
of faculties and institutions which are public) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
14. See Brief for Appellants at 19, Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390
F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433) ("[T]he government hit not one, but three distinct First
Amendment rights (academic freedom, free speech, and freedom of expressive
association) .... ").

15. See id. (alleging that the government "violated three distinct First Amendment
doctrines (the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine)").
16. See Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., v. Runsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 301
(D.N.J. 2003) ("For the reasons explained herein, the Solomon Amendment does not transgress
constitutional boundaries.").
17. Id. at 303.
18. See id. at 310 ("Ihe presence of the military on campus does not significantly
intrude upon the law schools' ability to express their views, thus presenting a very different
situation than those considered in Dale or Hurley.").
19. See Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3d Cir.
2004) ("We reverse and remand for the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.").
20.

Id.
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of granting deference to the law schools' associational determination of what
impairs their own expression.2'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard arguments on the case on
December 6, 2005.22 On March 6, 2006, the Court upheld the Solomon
Amendment, finding that it did not violate the law schools' freedoms of speech
and association, or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.23 The Supreme
Court found that the First Amendment would not inhibit Congress, under its
power to raise and support armies, from directly requiring access for military
recruiters to American law schools.24 Because the equal access requirements of
the Solomon Amendment could be imposed directly, these conditions could not
25
violate the First Amendment as a prerequisite to the receipt of federal funds.
Consequently, the Court did not find it necessary to address the law schools'
constitutional academic freedom claims. Thus, the FAIR case left important
questions concerning the First Amendment right of academic freedom, which
were raised by FAIR's argumentation, unresolved.
Courts gave academic freedom only the slightest ofroles in their treatment
of FAIR's challenge to the Solomon Amendment. 26 As FAIR recognized,
however, academic freedom lay at the heart of its claims.2 7 This Note discusses
FAIR's academic freedom arguments only as they apply to public schools.
Furthermore, it does not address law schools' academic freedom claims in
relation to the power of Congress or the needs of the military. Instead, this
Note seeks to delineate the limits of the First Amendment right of institutional
21. See id. at 233 n. 13 ("The Supreme Court's academic freedom jurisprudence thus
underscores the importance of Dale deference in our case.").
22. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 544 U.S. 1017, 1017 (2005)
(granting certiorari); Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supranote 11 (providing a
timeline of FAIR's litigation).
23. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006)
("Because Congress could require law schools to provide equal access to military recruiters
without violating the schools' freedom of speech or association, the Court of Appeals
erred. ...").
24. See id. at 1306 (noting that Congress's power to raise and support armies is "broad
and sweeping" and stating that there is no dispute that this power "includes the authority to
require campus access for military recruiters") (citations omitted).
25. See id. at 1307 ("Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from
directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an
unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds.").
26. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text (describing the role of academic
freedom in court opinions during the course of the FAIR litigation).
27. See Paul Horwitz, Grutter's FirstAmendment, 46 B.C. L. REv. 461, 519 (2005)
("FAIR and its fellow plaintiffs have said that academic freedom comprises 'the principal basis
of the[ir] legal challenge."') (citations omitted).

1136

63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1131 (2006)

academic freedom. It does so first by defining the purposes and functions of
constitutional academic freedom generally. Second, it juxtaposes FAIR's
institutional academic freedom arguments with these core principles, as well
as professors' and students' more clearly defined academic freedom rights.
The Court has carved out a prominent place for the First Amendment
freedom of association in recent cases such as Hurley v. Irish-AmericanGay,
Lesbian, & Bisexual Group ofBoston28 and Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale.29
Because First Amendment rights are highly contextual, however, it is unclear
how the freedom of association applies to public universities. 30 As FAIR's
associational claims failed, public universities are likely to return to
constitutional academic
freedom to uphold regulations, like
nondiscrimination policies, which adversely affect students' intellectual
autonomy. Addressing law schools' academic freedom arguments is thus
crucial because academic freedom is the one constitutional right universities
may always claim nudges a constitutional balancing test in their favor.
Constitutional academic freedom, however, may not be used to exclude
or marginalize speakers because of the viewpoints they represent. The
overriding goal of the Court's academic freedom jurisprudence is to protect
the integrity of the learning process by ensuring individuals' freedoms of
speech and thought. The Court's insulation of the academic realm has been
carefully crafted to preserve a wide marketplace of ideas that individuals may
utilize in an autonomous search for truth. As a result, the Court has granted
substantial academic freedom rights to students as a bulwark against
ideological coercion.
Because of constitutional academic freedom's
foundation in the concept of ideological neutrality, this Note argues that it
applies only to public schools. Furthermore, this Note maintains that
constitutional academic freedom cannot justify public universities' attempt to
erect a trade barrier against viewpoints their faculties find to be
objectionable.
Law schools' treatment of military recruiters is not the only instance in
which the academy has attempted to marginalize or bar dissenting voices
from college campuses. Public universities all over the United States have
28. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
581 (1995) (finding that the government could not change a private parade organization's
message by forcing it to include a homosexual group in its parade).
29. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (upholding the Boy Scouts'
right to exclude a homosexual scout master who would undermine the communication of the
Boy Scouts' view that homosexuality is immoral).
30. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
("First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students.").
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derecognized religious students groups, alleging that they violate the same
kind of nondiscrimination policies used to justify the exclusion of military
recruiters. 31 These institutional attempts at ideological coercion extend
further to grading graduate students in education on their commitment to
"social justice" and requiring students in social work programs to participate
in internships designed to promote "progressive social change. 3 2 Speech
codes have also been enacted at many public universities that prohibit
expression that could conceivably give offense on the basis of gender, sexual
orientation, race, or other categories. 3 This Note uses law schools' claims
against the military as a vehicle to discuss the importance of students'
academic freedom rights in maintaining their intellectual autonomy. The
same analysis would apply, however, to any attempt by public universities' to
enforce a moral or political view.
Part II of this Note briefly explores the historical origins of academic
freedom, its beginnings in the United States, and the justifications the
Supreme Court has offered for effectively incorporating academic freedom
into the First Amendment. Part III summarizes the development of
constitutional academic freedom and describes how it applies to teachers,
students, and universities as institutions. It argues that constitutional
academic freedom, as opposed to professional academic freedom, applies
only in the context of public universities. Part IV then outlines FAIR and its
amici's academic freedom claims.34
Finally, Part V explains why

31. See Mark Andrew Snider, Note, Viewpoint Discriminationby Public Universities:
Student Religious Organizationsand Violations of University NondiscriminationPolicies,61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 843 (2004) (describing this discrimination against some religious
groups); Brief for the Christian Legal Society at 11-12, as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, Rurmsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152)
(same).
32. John Leo, Class(room) Warriors, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 5, 2005,
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/051024/24john.htm (last visited June 4,2006)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Robin Wilson, Course Requirement or
Loyalty Test?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 16, 2005, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v52/i17/
17a0 1001.htm (last visited June 4, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See Wendy McElroy, Campus Conscience Police?, Fox NEWS, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,179321,00.html ("Speech codes prohibit expression that
could give offense on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, race or other historical
disadvantage ....The guidelines are often so vague as to prohibit the open discussion of issues
like affirmative action or religious objections to homosexuality.") (last visited June 4,2006) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. In this Note the terms "FAIR" and "law schools" are used interchangeably. This is
appropriate as FAIR is a corporation formed to advance the collective goals of individual law
schools or their faculties.
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constitutional academic freedom does not permit public law schools to
exclude competing viewpoints from the academic sphere.
II Overview ofAcademic Freedom
Constitutional academic freedom suddenly emerged in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence, springing much like Athena from the forehead of Zeus,
in the 1950s. 35 Of course, the theory that a university possesses certain
freedoms and immunities from external influences is much older. This Part
briefly outlines academic freedom's historical roots, its origins in the United
States, and the basis for the Supreme Court's assertion of its critical importance
for American society.
A. HistoricalAcademic Freedom
Medieval universities utilized the reputations of their scholars and their
semi-ecclesiastical corporate status to gain independence from both secular
rulers and ecclesiastical princes.36 By playing the competing forces of church
and state against each other, groups of scholars garnered the right to govern
themselves in most internal matters.37 These teachers' authority over the
educational process gave birth to the concept of academic freedom.
The rights enjoyed by universities in nineteenth-century Germany form the
basis of the modem conception of academic freedom in the United States.38
35. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 113 (1959) (questioning a teacher's
conviction for contempt of Congress for failing to disclose whether he had ever been a member
of the Communist Party); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957)
(invalidating a professor's conviction for contempt for refusing to answer questions pertaining
to his lectures, advocacy of socialism, and familiarity with a socialist political organization);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (striking down a loyalty oath requirement for
employees of a state college in Oklahoma); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485,489-91 (1952)
(concerning the dismissal of public school employees in New York who advocated, or were
members of organizations who advocated, the overthrow of the government by unlawful means).
36. See J. Peter Byme, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 267 (1989) (describing medieval English universities as
corporations that were able to gain autonomy by playing the crown and church against each
other); HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 121-22 ("Both the church principle of ecclesiastical
independence and the guild principle of corporate self-government provided the universities...
with dominant models of autonomy.").
37. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 6 ("In internal matters the universities had the
prerogative of self-government.").
38. See Todd A. DeMitchell, Academic Freedom-WhoseRights: The Professor'sor the
University's?, 168 EDUC. LAW. REP. 1, 3 (2002) (describing how Americans who had studied at
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German universities at that time were exclusively public and the state shielded
them from regional and sectarian pressures.3 9 German states maintained the
power to set universities' budgets, create new chairs, appoint professors, and
establish the overlying scheme of instruction. 40 Faculties had the right to elect
academic officials, appoint lecturers, and nominate professors. 4' Three specific
freedoms associated with these institutions coalesced to form the modern
paradigm of academic freedom: (1) Lehrfreiheit, the professors' freedom to
teach and research; (2) Lernfreiheit, the students' freedom to learn; and
(3) Freiheit der Wissenschaf, the university's freedom to govern its own
internal affairs.42 Over nine thousand Americans studied at German
universities during this period, returning home with first-hand experience of the
benefits these liberties provided.43
B. ProfessionalAcademic Freedom
The American Association of University Professors' (AAUP) 1915
Declaration of Principles (Declaration) serves as the seminal statement of
professional academic freedom in the United States. 44 Although the
German universities sought to remodel universities in the United States in the German image);
Horwitz, supranote 27, at 474 (discussing the significant influence of German universities on
the American conception of academic freedom).
39. See RicHARD HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREErioM N THE UNITED
STATES 385 (1955) (stating that in Germany the "universities belonged to the state, which
protected them against local and sectarian pressures").
40. See id. ("The state drew up the budgets, created new chairs, appointed professors, and
framed the general scheme of instruction.").
41. See id. ("[T]he election of academic officials, the appointment of lecturers... and the
nomination of professors were powers enjoyed by the faculty.").
42. See Clisby Louise Hall Barrow, Academic Freedomandthe University Title VII Suit

after University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC and Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1579-80 (1990) (summarizing the German model of academic freedom as
encompassing Lehrfreiheit, Lernfreiheit, and Freiheit der Wissenschaft); Gail Sorenson &
Andrew S. LaManque, The Application of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier in College Litigation, 22
J.C. & U.L. 971, 974-75 (1996) (same).
43. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 39, at 367 ("More than nine thousand Americans studied
at German universities in the nineteenth century. Through these students ... the methods and
ideals of the German university were transported into this country.").
44. See David M. Rabban, A FunctionalAnalysis of "Individual"and "Institutional"
Academic Freedom Under the FirstAmendment, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 227,232 (1990)
(characterizing the 1915 Declaration as the "foundation for the nonlegal understanding of
academic freedom within the academic world"); Horwitz, supra note 27, at 475 (stating that
academic freedom in the United States had its "proper birth... with the establishment of the
American Association of University Professors ... [and] its 1915 Declaration of Principles");
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Declaration refers both to Lehrfreiheit and to Lernfreiheit, it explicitly asserts
only professors' freedoms of thought, inquiry, discussion, and teaching. 45 The
Declaration justifies professors' special rights by their usefulness to society in
furthering the unfettered quest for truth, as well as in teaching citizens selfcritical, considered, and prescient judgment. 46 The drafters of the Declaration
recognized that these professorial rights have the "corresponding duties" of
conducting competent, patient, and sincere inquiry, exposing students to both
sides of controversial topics, and ultimately training students to think for
themselves. 47 Excluding non-experts from control over the educational sphere,
in the drafters' minds, eliminated the possibility that partisan objectives would
intercede in the educational process.4 8
The AAUP remains the primary expositor of academic freedom in the
United States to this day.49 In 1940, the AAUP drafted a Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (Statement) that lays out its
current views. The Statement serves as a more general exposition of the ideas
expressed in the Declaration, grounding the importance of academic freedom in
the common good.50 Society's welfare depends upon the "free search for truth
and its free exposition"-hence the importance of professors' freedom of

Byrne, supra note 36, at 277 (labeling the Declaration "the most influential statement of the case
for academic freedom").
45. See Am. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, PoucY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 292 (9th ed.
2001) (pointing out that academic freedom has traditionally applied to the freedom of the
teacher and the student, while establishing the intention of the drafters to deal only with the
former).
46. See id. at 297 ("One of [the university's] most characteristic functions in a democratic
society is to help make public opinion more self-critical and more circumspect, to check the
more hasty and unconsidered impulses of popular feeling, to train the democracy to the habit of
looking before and after.").
47. See id. at 298 (expounding upon the "correlative obligations" associated with
teachers' academic freedom).
48. See id. (finding it "inadmissible that the power of determining when departures from
the requirements of the scientific spirit and method have occurred, should be vested in bodies
not composed of members of the academic profession"). The Declaration also notes that if the
profession should prove unwilling "to prevent the freedom which it claims in the name of
science from being used as a shelter for inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical and
intemperate partisanship" that it is certain that this "task will be performed by others." Id.
49. See Brief for the American Association of University Professors at 1-3, as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219
(3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433) (describing the AAUP's role in establishing academic freedom in
the United States).
50. See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 45, at 3 ("Institutions of higher
education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the
individual teacher or the institution as a whole.").
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teaching and students' freedom of learning. 5' Professors' rights are the central
concern of the Statement, which consist of the freedom of teaching and
research, as well as the right to be free from censure for extracurricular
speech.52 The Statement asserts "duties correlative with [these] rights," but
these duties are left undefined.5 3 In addition, the 1940 Statement places new
emphasis on economic security as a prerequisite
for professors' successful
54
society.
to
obligations
their
of
fulfillment
C. Why Academic Freedom Matters
The Supreme Court has labeled academic freedom a "special concern of
the First Amendment. 5 5 It has justified this special treatment of the nation's
public educational sphere by its utility to American society as a whole.56 To
understand why the Supreme Court believes academic freedom is important,
however, one must first appreciate the Court's view of the overarching goals of
the First Amendment and how the Court believes academic freedom furthers
these fundamental principles.
The overriding theme of the Court's academic freedom jurisprudence is
respect for the political and ideological freedom of the individual. 7 Justice
51. Id.; see also id. ("Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the
protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning.").
52. See id. at 3-4 (listing the rights of teachers to academic freedom and tenure).
53. Id. The AAUP's 1970 interpretive comments on the 1940 Statement do highlight the
importance of the AAUP's 1966 Statement on Professional Ethics in describing these
professorial "responsibilities." Id. at 5.
54. See id. at 4 (describing the AAUP's view of"acceptable academic practice" in regard
to tenure).
55. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312 (1978); Keyishian v. Bd.of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
56. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 ("Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned.")
57. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972) ("'[T]he freedoms of speech, press,
petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate
or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish."' (quoting Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting))); Keyishian,
385 U.S. at 603 ("The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than
through any kind of authoritative selection.") (citations omitted); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("[A] fundamental principle of a democratic society is political
freedom of the individual."); Adler v. Bd.of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The Framers knew the danger of dogmatism; they also knew the strength that
comes when the mind is free, when ideas may be pursued wherever they lead. We forget these
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Black expressed this understanding of the First Amendment as a fundamental
"policy" or "belief that government should leave the mind and spirit of man
absolutely free."58 In order for this freedom to be realized, each individual must
have a broad range of views-or a marketplace of ideas-from which to
choose, as choice without options is meaningless.5 Enabling individuals to
engage in this autonomous search for truth is a primary function of the First
Amendment6 °
Intellectual controversy is inherently good, not only because it gives life to
liberty of inquiry, but also because it shapes the intellectual process of those
exposed to it in important ways. Awareness of a broad spectrum of views
inculcates the versatility of thought, independence, and vigor that characterize
Americans and which the Court views as a unique source of national strength.'
Maintaining diverse viewpoints is conditioned, however, upon government's
neutrality in the realm of ideas and public respect for the high value the First
Amendment places on individuals' freedom of conscience. 2
The First Amendment preserves government neutrality by denying the
state the power to "do anything to hinder or destroy the capacity of individuals
and groups to seek converts and votes for any cause, however radical or
unpalatable their principles might seem under the accepted notion of the

teachings of the First Amendment when we sustain this law.").
58. Adler, 342 U.S. at 497 (Black, J., dissenting).
59. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (emphasizing the "peculiar[]" nature of the college
classroom as a "marketplace of ideas" from which students may choose); Keyishian, 385 U.S at
603 (same).
60. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 ("The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude
of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.") (citations omitted); Adler,
342 U.S. at 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[I]t was the pursuit of truth which the First
Amendment was designed to protect.").
61. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (citing the "independence and
vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this ... often disputatious society"); Adler, 342
U.S. at 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A school system producing students trained as robots
threatens to rob a generation of the versatility that has been perhaps our greatest distinction.").
62. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,317 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing an "equality of status in the field of ideas" that government must
respect); Pico, 457 U.S. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[I]f educators intentionally may
eliminate all diversity of thought, the school will strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.") (citations
omitted); Healy, 408 U.S. at 188 ("[T]he freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly
guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.") (citations omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("'The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect."' (quoting Watson v. Jones 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871))).
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time., 63 Appropriately, the Court has identified the invitation to dispute as
a primary function of this freedom of speech. 64 Society will not tolerate
dispute, however, unless Americans both recognize
and appreciate the
65
freedom.
intellectual
individual
of
importance
Citizens learn the importance of this fundamental liberty in public
schools.66 The Court sees public schools as the forum in which individuals
imbibe the tolerance for conflicting views, which in turn enables them to
pass this value on to successive generations.67 The importance of each new
generation learning this fundamental principle justifies the Court's
assertion of the value of academic freedom to American society as a
whole.68
For academic freedom to be effective, however, public schools must
foster a unique environment dedicated to free inquiry and expression. 69
63. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); see also
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.").
64. See Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31,33(1970) ("'[A] function of free speech
under our system of government is to invite dispute."' (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949))).
65. See Pico,457 U.S. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[I]f educators intentionally
may eliminate all diversity of thought, the school will strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.") (citations
omitted).
66. See id. (stating the need for students to be exposed to diversity of thought in order to
appreciate the basic principles of American government); Knight,465 U.S. at 296 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[P]rotecting the free exchange of ideas within our schools is of profound
importance in promoting an open society.").
67. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003) (quoting Bakke); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,313 (1978) ("[T]he nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of
many peoples.") (citations omitted); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
("The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any
kind of authoritative selection.") (citations omitted).
68. See Minn. State. Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,296 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("[P]rotecting the free exchange of ideas within our schools is of profound
importance in promoting an open society."); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A school system producing students trained as robots threatens to rob
a generation of the versatility that has been perhaps our greatest distinction.").
69. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (summarizing these principles as the "expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment"); Knight, 465 U.S.
at 293 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that universities have the "responsibility to advance the
frontiers of knowledge through unfettered inquiry and debate"); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603
(citing Sweezy); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 34 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(characterizing universities as a "fitting place for the dissemination of a wide spectrum of
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Hence, as Justice Frankfurter
stated in his foundational opinion in Sweezy
70
v. New Hampshire:
A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of
Church or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized
by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates-to
follow the argument where it leads. This implies the right to examine,
question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and
hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine
is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is
not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework,
71

but to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself.

Only if public universities remain true to their mission to be marketplaces
of ideas will students acquire the respect for dissent and individual
intellectual autonomy that make the American system of government
possible.72

ideas"); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.").
70. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957) (finding that the Due
Process Clause precluded Sweezy from being held in contempt for refusing to testify about his
university lectures and knowledge of the Progressive Party of New Hampshire). In Sweezy, the
Court considered the validity of a professor's contempt conviction for refusing to testify in
regard to his socialist political leanings and familiarity with the Progressive Party of New
Hampshire. Id. at 238-44. The Attorney General of New Hampshire subpoenaed Sweezy to
testify on two separate occasions. Id. at 238. He refused to testify to questions relating to his
university lectures and knowledge of the Progressive Party of New Hampshire. Id. at 248. A
state court held Sweezy in contempt. Id. at 244-45. Noting the expansive definition of
"subversive persons" in the New Hampshire statute, the Court found that its scope went "well
beyond" those intending to alter the nation's form of government by force or violence. Id. at
246. The Court found the statute's definition of"subversive organizations" similarly broad. Id.
at 247. Because the sole basis of the Attorney General's inquiry was to scrutinize the professor
as an individual, the court determined that there had been an invasion of Sweezy's "liberties in
the areas of academic freedom and political expression." Id. at 250. The Court concluded that
because there was no indication that the legislature actually wanted the information that the
attorney general had elicited from Sweezy, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment disallowed the use of the contempt power in this case. Id. at 254-55.
71. Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 331 ("This Court has long recognized that education.., is
the very foundation of good citizenship.") (citations omitted); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 877 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Barnette); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular
instruction and political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party, or
faction.").
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III. ConstitutionalAcademic Freedom
The Court has used constitutional academic freedom to halt blatant
invasions of individual liberty in the academic context. Consequently, the
focus of academic freedom has shifted through the years to reflect the class of
individuals currently held in the crosshairs of governmental power. When the
Court confronted its first academic freedom cases, its precedents provided for
less protection to speech than at present.73 Until the twentieth century the
Supreme Court's encounters with the First Amendment had been rare. The
Court's view of First Amendment freedoms, even in the late 1950s, was
somewhat restrictive. 74 Speech found contrary to the public welfare, the peace,
or the foundations of governmental authority was less likely to be protected.75
The first academic freedom cases, which concerned the rights of teachers, arose
as one of the first chinks in the armor of this narrow conception of individuals'
freedom to hold and effectively advocate their views.
A. The Teacher
The Supreme Court introduced constitutional academic freedom to the law
in the 1950s and 1960s to circumscribe government's targeting of public school
teachers and professors with socialist sympathies or communist views.76
73. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 655, 668, 670 (1925) (ruling that the
state's "right of selfpreservation" justified upholding Gitlow's conviction for criminal anarchy
for writing a document entitled the Left Wing Manifesto and publishing a newspaper called The
Revolutionary Age); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214-15 (1919) (finding that if one
purpose of speech is opposition to a specific war, and the natural effect of that expression is to
obstruct military recruiting, that the speech is not protected by the First Amendment).
74. For example, the Court did not adopt an imminency requirement for the proscription
of advocacy of illegal activity or the use of force, thereby overruling Whitney, until its decision
in Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
75. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ("[A] State in the exercise of its
police power may punish those who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances inimical to the
public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations
of organized government .... ").
76. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967) (invalidating a New
York statute making treasonable or seditious words grounds for removal from the public school
system or state employment); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 60-62 (1967) (disapproving a
loyalty oath applied to teachers); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 113 (1959)
(questioning a teacher's conviction for contempt of Congress for failing to disclose whether he
had ever been a member of the Communist Party); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
254-55 (1957) (invalidating a professor's conviction for contempt for refusing to answer
questions pertaining to his lectures, advocacy of socialism, and familiarity with a socialist
political organization); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (striking down a loyalty
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Concerned that instructors were inculcating their students with revolutionary
ideas, both state and local governments began to intervene actively in the
academic realm." Initially the Court's academic freedom cases involved
loyalty oaths, contempt proceedings for failure to disclose knowledge of or
participation in socialist groups, and statutes making treasonable or seditious
words grounds for removal from public employment. 78 Consequently, these
cases tend to focus on the individual teacher's First Amendment freedoms of
association, belief, and speech.
While the Court did not always intervene to protect teachers' intellectual
freedoms, several Justices began to articulate the broad grant of autonomy of
advocacy and belief now associated with the First Amendment.7 9 Justice
Black's dissent in Barenblattv. United States, 0 which upheld a professor's
contempt conviction for failing to disclose whether he had ever been a member1
of the Communist party, exemplifies these defenses of intellectual freedom.
oath requirement for employees of a state college in Oklahoma); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S.
485, 488-91 (1952) (concerning the dismissal of public school employees in New York who
advocated or were members of organizations who advocated the overthrow of government by
unlawful means).
77. See supranote 76 (citing cases that reveal government efforts to remove teachers with
socialist or communist views).
78. See supranote 76 (summarizing the issues presented in the academic freedoms cases
of the 1950s and 1960s).
79. Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas were particularly active in this regard. See
infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (offering examples of their defense of an unfettered
individual search for truth).
80. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (upholding Barenblatt's
conviction for contempt for failing to answer questions concerning his political beliefs and
association with the Communist Party). The issue in Barenblatt was whether Congress could
compel a teacher to testify as to his membership in the Communist Party during an inquiry into
Communist infiltration of the field of education. Id. at 113. Barenblatt asserted that Congress
had no authority to question him on his political beliefs or associational activities and refused to
answer questions regarding his affiliations and knowledge of the Communist Party. Id. at 114.
The Court found that Congress had granted the Un-American Activities Committee "pervasive
authority to investigate Communist activities in this country," that the field of education had not
been excluded from its purview, that Barenblatt had knowledge of the nature of the inquiry, and
that the questions posed to him were relevant to the investigation at issue. Id. at 118, 121, 12425. Further, the Court determined that a balancing of the private and public interests inthe case
had to be resolved in favor of the government based on Congress's "wide power to legislate in
the field of Communist activity" and the Court's long-standing refusal to view "the Communist
Party as an ordinary political party." Id. at 127-28. Ultimately, the Court found the national
interest in "self preservation" justified upholding Barenblatt's conviction. Id. at 128, 134.
81. Another example of these early defenses of individual belief and inquiry is found in
Justice Douglas's dissent in Adler v. Boardof Education, 342 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1952), in
which he states:
[S]pying and surveillance with its accompanying reports and trials cannot go hand
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In Barenblatt,Justice Black denied that government has the power to proscribe
ideas.82 Instead, he maintained that "the only constitutional way our
Government can preserve itself is to leave its people the fullest possible
freedom to praise, criticize or discuss, as they see fit, all governmental policies
and to suggest, if they desire, that even its most fundamental postulates are bad
and should be changed.0 3 The rhetoric set forth in this era reflects these
Justices' interest in assuring that teachers and professors would not be
discharged for expressing their "philosophical, political, or ideological
beliefs. , , 4
The Court has also recognized that academic freedom extends First
Amendment principles of autonomous inquiry into the employment relationship
between college level instructors and the state. 85 Dicta in cases covering a wide
time span and diverse issues address these prerogatives of professors, which
include the freedoms of teaching and research. Ranging from the 1950s to the
year 2000, relevant cases deal with questions as to whether professors are
managerial employees,8 6 the right of professors to counsel the state on
employment policies,87 and the content of the science curriculum in public
schools. 8 Affirming professors' right to direct their own research and teaching
in hand with academic freedom. It produces standardized thought, not the pursuit
of truth. Yet it was the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to
protect. A system which directly or inevitably has that effect is alien to our system
and should be struck down. Its survival is a real threat to our way of life. We need
be bold and adventuresome in our thinking to survive.
82. See Barenblatt,360 U.S. at 145 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I... deny that ideas can be
proscribed under our Constitution.").
83. Id. at 145-46 (Black, J., dissenting).
84. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 581 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
85. See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 n.6 (1990) ("Where, as was the
situation in the academic-freedom cases, government attempts to direct the content of speech at
public educational institutions, complicated First Amendment issues are presented because
government is simultaneously both speaker and regulator.").
86. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 700 (1980) ("[T]he notion that a faculty
member's professional competence could depend on his undivided loyalty to management is
antithetical to the whole concept of academic freedom. Faculty members are judged by their
employer on... their teaching and scholarship, not on the compatibility of their advice with
administration policy.").
87. See Minn. State. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,296 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("[W]e have not hesitated to strike down laws that effectively inhibit the free
discussion of novel or controversial ideas.., or that directly prohibit the teaching of unpopular
subject matter.") (citations omitted).
88. See Edwards v. Augillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987) (stating that "academic
freedom.., might, in common parlance, be understood as referring to enhancing the freedom of
teachers to teach what they will").

1148

63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1131 (2006)

so often in dicta, the Court now seems to take these aspects of teachers'
academic freedom for granted. Justice Souter, for example, described this facet
of constitutional academic freedom in 2000 as the "autonomy that bars
legislatures (and courts) from imposing conditions on the spectrum of subjects
89
taught and viewpoints expressed in college teaching.
B. The Student
The Supreme Court has applied constitutional academic freedom not only
to teachers but also to students in public schools at both the secondary and
university level. 90 More than a decade before the early academic freedom
cases, the Court established students' rights to freedom of conscience by
striking down a law requiring them to salute the American flag. 91 Justice
Jackson, in his opinion for the Court, explained that if there is "any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."9 2 Later,
in Barenblatt, the Court explicitly recognized that this principle mandated
recognizing students' "learning-freedom" as the natural "corollary" to

89. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring).
Despite academic freedom's popular association with the rights of professors, the Supreme
Court's constitutional academic freedom jurisprudence more clearly defines the rights of
students than it does the rights of their teachers. Compare supra Part III.A (laying out the
Court's portrayal of the constitutional academic freedom rights of professors), with infra Part
III.B (summarizing the Court's description of the constitutional academic freedom rights of
students).
90. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 588 n.8 ("The dissent concludes that the Act's purpose was
to protect the academic freedom of students, and not that of teachers. Such a view is not at odds
with our conclusion.. . ."); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("Students as well as faculty are entitled to credentials in their search for truth."); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 n.5 (1964) ("[The interests of the students at the University in
academic freedom are fully protected .... "); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S.
214, 226 n.12 (1985) ("Academic freedom thrives.., on the independent and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among teachers and students. . . ."); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.

589, 603 (1967) ("Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned."); Whitehill v.
Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 60 (1967) (citing Sweezy); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957) ("Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.").
91. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (establishing that
students could not be compelled to salute or pledge allegiance to the United States flag).
92.

Id.
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"academic teaching-freedom. 9 3 In Keyishian v. Boardof Regents,94 a 1967
case concerning the dismissal of two college instructors for failing to divulge
whether they had ever been Communists, the Court expounded on academic
freedom generally. 95 The Keyishian Court labeled academic freedom a "special
concern of the First Amendment. 9 6 Explaining that academic freedom is "of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely the teachers concerned" and that
"the classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,"' the Court suggested
that constitutional academic freedom applied to students.97 Not until the 1970s,
however, would the Court elaborate upon the full extent of students' academic
freedom.
Societal conflict surrounding the Vietnam War first prompted the Court to
revisit students' academic freedom rights. In Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,98 a case concerning secondary
93. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
94. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,606 (1967) (ruling that membership in
an organization that advocates unlawful activity is not a sufficient basis for excluding an
individual from public employment). In Keyishian, the Court examined the validity of the
dismissal of two teachers by the public University of New York for refusing to divulge whether
they were or had ever been Communists. Id.at 592. New York passed the Feinberg Law,
which required the State Board of Regents to promulgate regulations for the disqualification and
removal of persons in the public school system who engaged in treasonable or seditious speech
or activity, or who were members of"subversive organizations." Id.at 593-94. The University
dismissed Keyishian, a professor, as well as another individual, who was a librarian and parttime lecturer in English, for failure to comply with a policy that required them to sign a
statement that they were not Communists, or if they had ever been Communists that they had
revealed this fact. Id. at 592. The Court found the statute's definitions of "treasonable" and
"seditious" to be unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 598-99. Justice Brennan found it particularly
significant that a teacher could not reasonably determine "justwhere the line is drawn between
'seditious' and nonseditious utterances and acts." Id. at 599. Placing particular emphasis on
academic freedom, the Court ruled that although the government's purpose was legitimate, it
could not pursue this legitimate end by means that broadly stifled fundamental liberties when
more narrowly tailored means were available. Id. at 602. The Court declared that membership
in an organization, without specific intent to further its unlawful aims, is not a sufficient
constitutional basis for exclusion from employment by the state. Id. at 606.
95. See supra note 94 (detailing the Court's holding in Keyishian).
96. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
97.

Id.

98. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,514(1969) (finding
students' silent war protest, while at school, to be speech protected by the First Amendment).
Tinker presented the question of whether a public school could constitutionally ban students
from wearing black armbands on school premises in symbolic opposition to the Vietnam War.
Id. at 504. A group of students objecting to the Vietnam War decided to voice support for a
truce by wearing black armbands and fasting on two predetermined dates. Id. Principals in Des
Moines became aware of the plan and declared that students who refused to remove their
armbands while at school would be suspended. Id. School officials suspended five students for
wearing the armbands and promptly sent them home. Id. at 508. The Court explained that
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students' war protest involving the wearing of black armbands, the Court made
clear that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate. " 99 Tinker established that "students may
not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses
to communicate." 0 0 As a result, students are free to express their views unless
doing so "materially and substantially" interferes with appropriate school
discipline or collides with the rights of others.10 '
Three years later the Court took up college students' academic freedoms in
Healy v. James.0 2 Healy involved a suit by Students for a Democratic Society
against a public university for refusing to recognize the group as an official
student organization because of its virulent antiwar views. 0 3 Recognizing the
possible conflict between a university's autonomous decisionmaking and the
students and teachers do not loose their constitutional rights in the school environment. Id. at
506. The Court characterized the wearing of armbands here as "entirely divorced" from
disruptive conduct and thus closely akin to "pure speech." Id. at 505. Finding that an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression," the Court ruled that prohibitions of expression must be based on more
than a desire to avoid the tension that inevitably accompanies an unpopular viewpoint. Id. at
508-09. Prohibitions on student speech may not be viewpoint specific. Id.at 511. Because the
students' actions did not constitute a "substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities," the Court upheld the students' right to protest. Id. at 514.
99. Id. at 506.
100.
101.

Id. at511.
Id.at513.

102. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (finding that a state university could
not deny official recognition to a student group based upon the viewpoint its members wished to
express). The question presented in Healy was whether Central Connecticut State College
(CCSC) could deny recognized status to a group called Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) based upon opposition to the group's ideology, a likely connection to a national
organization that had disrupted other college campuses nationally, and other unspecific fears of
interference with school activities. Id. at 172-76. The students involved properly prepared an
application for official recognition at CCSC, stating that the aims of the group were to provide a
forum for discussion and self-education for students to bring about constructive change and to
provide a coordinating body for relating problems of leftist students with others. Id. at 172.
The president of the university found the group's philosophy antithetical to the school's
policies. Id. at 174-75. The Court found that the denial of official recognition seriously
hindered the organization's "existence and growth." Id. at 176. The Court stressed the
constitutional significance of an academic environment offering "the widest latitude for free
expression and debate consonant with the maintenance of order." Id. at 17 1. Justice Powell
found that the college had imposed a form of prior restraint upon its students' freedom of
association. Id. at 181, 184. The Court stated that the government may not "restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent." Id. at
187-88. Ultimately, the Court determined that the burden rested on the college to prove that
official recognition of SDS was not appropriate and remanded the case. Id. at 184, 194.
103. See id. at 173-76 (discussing the nature of the school's objections to the student
group).
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"widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with the maintenance
of order," the Court declared that when these interests conflict the First
Amendment "strikes the required balance."' 1 4 Healy thus makes clear that a
state university may not "restrict speech or association simply because it finds
the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent." 05 Justice Powell's opinion
in Healy further emphasized that all of students' First Amendment freedoms,
°6
including that of association, apply in full force within public universities'
In the late 1960s and 1980s, the Court began to actualize a facet of student
academic freedom more finely tailored to the academic context-what the
Court in Barenblatttermed "learning-freedom."'0 7 The Court sowed the seeds
of the freedom to learn in the 1920s by invalidating state statutes banning the
instruction of children inforeign languages' 0 8 Tinker re-characterized these
prohibitions on learning as "unconstitutionally interfer[ing] with the liberty of
teacher, student, and parent."'9 The famous case of Griswoldv. Connecticut o
further laid down a categorical prohibition on government "contract[ing] the
spectrum of available knowledge," which further reinforced this principle.'
Thereafter, several Justices, in cases involving secondary schools, located
within the First Amendment a "guarantee of free communication," or the "right
to hear, to learn, [and] to know."'1 2 By 1982, a majority of the Court asserted
that the Court's precedents recognized students' "right to receive information
and ideas" and utilized this right in overruling a school board's decision to

104.
105.

Id. at 171.
Id. at 187-88.

106. See id. at 180 ("[Tlhe precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that,
because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with
less force on college campuses than in the community at large.").
107. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1958).
108. See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404,409 (1923) (overturning a conviction for teaching
German in light of Meyer); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (invalidating
Meyer's conviction for teaching German to a child under a statute that forbade instructing
children in foreign languages).
109. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
110. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (finding a Connecticut law
forbidding use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon married couples' right of
privacy).
111. Id.
112. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 409 U.S. 998,999 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("The First Amendment involves not only the right to
speak and publish but also the right to hear, to learn, to know."); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 116 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting the "guarantees of free communication
contained in the First Amendment, and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth").
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remove certain books from secondary school libraries.' 1 3 Thus, the Court has
indicated, as Justice Douglas stated in Healy, that "[s]tudents as well as 4faculty
are entitled to credentials [or certain rights] in their search for truth.""
C. The University
The Court's vision of constitutional academic freedom has never focused
solely on individual rights. In fact, Justice Frankfurter's influential opinion in
Sweezy, which serves as the basis of the Court's academic freedom
jurisprudence, set forth the "four essential freedoms of a university."" 5 These
freedoms, which are often repeated in the Court's university cases, consist of
the freedom to determine "on academic grounds who may teach, what may 'be6
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.""
Academic freedom, in its institutional guise, traditionally applies to these rights,
which grant educational experts the corporate ability to govern the aspects of
university life most intimately related to the educational process.
In more recent cases, the Court's notion of institutional academic freedom
has expanded beyond a recognition of the four explicit freedoms of universities,
to include a generalized principle of deference to a university's academic
decisions. 17 For example, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,"18 involving a challenge to a state medical school's race-conscious
113. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982); see also id.at 867 ("[W]e have
held in a variety of contexts 'the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas."' (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969))).
114. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
115. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 363 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,279 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Univ.
of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 196 (1990); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 312 (1978); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
116. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
117. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,328 (2003) ("Our holding today is in keeping
with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits."); Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990)
("[C]ourts have stressed the importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate academic
judgments."); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 ("Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution
of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and
sharply implicate basic constitutional values."); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 ("We believe that there
unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and
political expression-areas in which government should be extremely reticent to tread.").
118. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (finding the
admissions policy at the Medical School of the University of California at Davis
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admissions program, the Court highlighted "[t]he freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education."1 9 Even in cases where the Court has
not sided with the university, it has gone to great pains to affirm this "respect
for legitimate academic decisionmaking." 120 The majority opinion in Grutterv.
Bollinger,another challenge to race-conscious admissions, represents the most
sweeping example of this deference, which Justice O'Connor described as
effectuating the "constitutional dimension... of educational autonomy." 121
Respect for this autonomy has led the Court to defer increasingly to
universities' 22academic judgment on matters affecting the university
community.
While this deference to academic judgment is substantial, it is not
absolute. 2 3 As the Court has recognized, "[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools."'124 Students' First Amendment freedoms have been singled
out for special protection within this environment.1 25 A choice by school
authorities must be a truly academic decision, and thus consonant with
educational expertise, to receive deference from a court. 26 The Supreme Court
has resisted school officials' efforts to extend such deference to decisions that

unconstitutional but upholding the use of race in state schools' admissions decisions).
119. Id.at312.
120. Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990).
121. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
122. The four dissenting Justices in Gruttercommented extensively on the "unprecedented
deference" the majority granted to the law school. Id. at 362 (Thomas, J., dissenting and
concurring in part); see also id. at 380 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites
the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its
deference."); id. at 388-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court, in a review that is nothing
short of perfunctory, accepts the University of Michigan Law School's assurances that its
admissions process meets with constitutional requirements.").
123. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957) ("Political power must
abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government
and the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.").
124. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
125. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 ("Our courts.., have not failed to apply the First
Amendment's mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental
values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief.").
126. See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) ("[C]ourts have stressed the
importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate academic judgments ....
Nothing we say
today should be understood as a retreat from this principle of respect for legitimate academic
decisionmaking.").
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unnecessarily inhibit students' First Amendment freedoms. 127 This resistance is
at its height when the school attempts to regulate voluntary learning activities
2
that take place outside of the compulsory environment of the classroom.' 1
D. UnderstandingAcademic Freedom
The Supreme Court has never stated whether constitutional academic
freedom applies to private universities. 29 The Court, however, has never
applied constitutional academic freedom to a private school. 3 ° While no
127. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (finding that government may not
"restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be
abhorrent"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (ruling
that school officials' expulsion of students for wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War
violated the students' First Amendment rights); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) ("We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all
official control.").
128. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) ("Petitioners might well defend
their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum ....But we think that petitioners'
reliance upon that duty is misplaced where.., they attempt to extend their claim of absolute
discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom....").
129. See Rabban, supra note 44, at 266-67 ("The Court has never had to resolve whether
constitutional academic freedom has different meanings at private than at public universities,
but it did recognize this issue in University of Pennsylvania [sic], its only major decision
involving an academic freedom claim by a private university.").
130. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (bringing suit against the
University of Michigan); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,221 (2000) (regarding a
suit brought against the University of Wisconsin); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474
U.S. 214, 215 (1985) (concerning a suit brought against the University of Michigan); Pico,457
U.S. at 856 (bringing suit against the Board of Education of the Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 263 (1981) (regarding an action taken by
the University of Missouri at Kansas City); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
269 (1978) (concerning a suit brought against the University of California); Healy, 408 U.S. at
172 (bringing suit against Central Connecticut State College); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504
(regarding an act of the Des Moines School District); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98 (concerning the
science curriculum in Arkansas's public schools); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
591 (1967) (bringing suit against the State University of New York); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 114 (1958) (regarding Barenblatt's activities while at the University of
Michigan); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 243 (1957) (concerning a professor's
lecture at the University of New Hampshire); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 487 (1952)
(bringing suit against the Board of Education of the City of New York); see also NLRB v.
Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 700 (1980) (discussing professional academic freedom,
rather than constitutional academic freedom, in characterizing professors at a private university
as managerial employees); Univ. ofPenn., 493 U.S. at 199 (refusing to recognize an "expanded'
academic freedom right to shield a private university's tenure review files).
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definitive answer to this question is possible, it is worth addressing because the
result may substantially strengthen or weaken law schools' and universities'
First Amendment claims.' 3' FAIR asserted academic freedom, freedom of
speech, and the freedom of association as three separate shields against
governmental interference in universities' internal affairs. 132 This section
argues that constitutional academic freedom applies only to public universities
and that public schools do not possess additional associational rights.
Constitutional academic freedom gains coherence as a First Amendment
doctrine only in its application to public schools. The Court's conception of
constitutional academic freedom encompasses three distinct groupsprofessors, students, and universities as institutions.' 33 Professors and students
necessarily possess the First Amendment rights of free speech and association
all citizens hold against governmental coercion. What sets professors' and
students' academic freedoms apart from these other First Amendment rights is
context-academic freedom is asserted against the government in the context of
applied to private
public schools. 134 These rights are meaningless when
35
universities because there is no state actor involved. 1
Only public schools need constitutional academic freedom to be insulated
from direct government control, thus enabling them to exercise the four
131. It is clear, however, that professional academic freedom applies to both public and
private universities. See Rabban, supranote 44, at 231 (stating that the professional conception
of academic freedom "applies equally in public and private universities"). But see DeMitchell,
supranote 38, at 18 ("Alleged violations of academic freedom in the private sector are typically
adjudicated using contract law and not constitution [sic] law. Academic freedom is a special
concern of the First Amendment and not contract law.").
132. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 30 ("[T]he government regulation in this
case calls into play three distinct constitutional rights-academic freedom, freedom of speech,
and freedom of expressive association.").
133. See supra Part III.A-C (detailing the Court's application of constitutional academic
freedom to professors, students, and universities).
134. See supra note 130 (listing the public schools involved in the Court's academic
freedom cases). But see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1958) (regarding
Barenblatt's conviction for contempt of Congress); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
243 (1957) (concerning Sweezy's contempt conviction for refusing to answer questions posed
by the New Hampshire Attorney General). Barenblattand Sweezy did not involve cases against
public schools, although they involved events at public universities. They have been described,
however, as free speech cases. See, e.g., Horwitz, supranote 27, at 483 (stating that the court's
"clear concern" in Sweezy was "regulation of speech ... in an academic context"); Rebecca
Gose Lynch, Note, Pawns of the State or Priestsof Democracy?, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1082
(2003) ("Where a court determines that a professor's speech.., constitutes citizen speech in
which the state lacks any special interest, the claim is not properly one of academic freedom but
rather one of freedom of speech generally.").
135. See Rabban, supra note 44, at 231 ("In private universities... state action applies
only to claims by professors and universities against the state.").
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essential freedoms of a university. 136 Individuals in private schools possess the
primary First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, association, and in some
cases religion, which effectively insulates them from governmental
interference. 37 The Court's recent exposition of the freedom of association
in Dale, which focused "on expressive associations rather than the act of
associating itself,"'138 provides private schools with particularly strong
protection against government
attempts to commandeer their expression for
39
governmental purposes. 1
Public schools lack this associational protection because, as arms of
the state, they are subject to the general principle that the government may
not assert constitutional rights against itself. Institutional academic
freedom exists to grant a measure of associational autonomy to public
schools in carrying out their core academic functions. 140 Academic
freedom is thus unique because it is "the only constitutional right exercised
by state actors.' 4' Professors' constitutional academic freedom allows
1 42
them, as state actors, to assert constitutional rights against the state.
Similarly, the constitutional academic freedom of universities as
institutions allows public universities, as governmental entities, to preclude
43
other government actors from interfering with purely academic affairs.
Public institutions are further subject to governmental norms of
ideological neutrality that set them apart from their private peers.144 They
136. See supra Part III.C (discussing the four essential freedoms of a university).
137. See Rabban, supra note 44, at 300 ("Independent constitutional rights ... may protect
the autonomy of private universities .... But these additional constitutional rights, because
they do not address the distinctive functions of professors and universities, should not fall under
the rubric of academic freedom.").
138. Daniel A. Farber, Speakingin the FirstPersonPlural: Expressive Associationsand
the FirstAmendment, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1483, 1485 (2001).
139. See Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the
Expression ofAssociations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1842 (2001) ("[A]ssociations... mediate
between persons and the state; and the First Amendment denies to government any right or
power to standardize belief or impose orthodoxy by commandeering such expression or
transmission.").
140. See Byrne, supra note 36, at 300 ("A state university is a unique state entity in that it
enjoys federal constitutional rights against the state itself.").
141. Id.
142. See Cheryl A. Cameron et al., Academic Bills ofRights: Conflict in the Classroom,
31 J.C. & U.L. 243, 248 (2005) ("Constitutional academic freedom can only be claimed by
faculty at governmental institutions.").
143. See supra Part III.C (describing the four essential freedoms of a university).
144. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104(1968) ("'The law knows no heresy, and
is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."' (quoting Watson v.
Jones 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871))).
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have "less discretion than private universities in selecting educational
purposes that arguably deviate from democratic values" because such a
deviation would "violate the [F]irst [A]mendment obligations of public
universities to diversity of thought." 45 The Supreme Court has justified
constitutional academic freedom in terms of this ideological neutrality
46
principle and thus tailored it to the unique function of public schools.
Conceptualizing the institutional rights of public and private universities in
the same way, therefore, is fundamentally misleading. The freedoms of
universities to determine who shall teach, what shall be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who shall be admitted to study mean substantially different
things in the public and private context, at least as far as the Constitution is
concerned. Institutional academic freedom gives public universities great
latitude in this regard, but it147does not give them rights equal to those
possessed by private schools.
Ultimately, "the only constant for academic freedom is the public
institution."'' 48 Professors and students in private schools possess general
First Amendment protection against government invasion of their
intellectual liberties. 49 After Dale, private schools may claim similar
generally applicable associational rights. 50 Constitutional academic
freedom applies only when the government is "simultaneously both speaker
and regulator."' 5' Only public universities meet this description, asserting
limited associational rights against the government, while5 regulating
the
2
expression of professors and students as arms of the state.1
145. Rabban, supra note 44, at 268.
146. See supra Part II.C (explaining the rationales the Court has used to justify
constitutional academic freedom); Lynch, supranote 134, at 1090 ("[T]he Supreme Court has
justified the concept [of constitutional academic freedom] by reference to particular missions of
public educational institutions.").
147. See Rabban, supranote 44, at 268 (stating that public universities are "bound by the
[F]irst [A]mendment in their relationships with faculty and students").
148. DeMitchell, supra note 38, at 18.
149. Professors in private schools also enjoy professional academic freedom rights as a
matter of contract. See id. ("Alleged violations of academic freedom in the private sector are
typically adjudicated using contract law and not constitution [sic] law.").
150. See Farber, supra note 138, at 1496 (conmenting that in Hurley and Dale the Court
focused on "protecting the expression of organizations, rather than on protecting the desire of
the members to combine their voices"); see also Horwitz, supranote 27, at 520 (noting that the
Third Circuit drew on an aggressive reading of Dale to strike down the Solomon Amendment).
151. Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 n.6 (1990).
152. See Rabban, supra note 44, at 231 ("[P]ublic universities may invoke the [F]irst
[A]mendment to assert independence from the states that create them, and simultaneously are
themselves state institutions constrained by the [F]irst [A]mendment.").
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IV. Academic Freedom and the Law Schools

Although both the district court and Third Circuit gave academic freedom
little weight in their constitutional analysis, FAIR once described academic
freedom as "the principal basis" of its claims.153 Law schools' conception of
academic freedom centers upon an aggressive notion of institutional
sovereignty, actualized through the four essential freedoms of a university and a
more generalized principle of universities' autonomy from the state. 54 This
Part summarizes law schools' claims concerning the two essential freedoms of
a university that are arguably infringed by the Solomon Amendment-the
freedom to determine what shall be taught and how it shall be taught-as well
as law schools' general claims to deference from the Court.
A. Setting the Stage
Most law schools have made the institutional decision that discrimination
in employment against homosexuals is immoral and unacceptable because
sexual practices bear no relation to individuals' suitability for employment.' 55
Consequently, they have instituted nondiscrimination policies that prohibit
recruiters who discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation from using law
schools' offices of career services. 6 Law schools asserted that these
nondiscrimination policies have pedagogical significance because law
professors deliberately seek to inculcate their students with nondiscriminatory
57
views.

153. Horwitz, supra note 27, at 519.
154. See id. at 521 (commenting that FAIR's claims draw heavily off of an institutional
autonomy reading of academic freedom rooted in the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter).
155. See Complaint at 3, Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.
Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (03 Civ. 4433) (stating that sexual orientation bears "no relation to
merit").
156. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari at 19, Rumsfeld v. Forum
for Academic & Inst. Rights, No. 04-1152 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 2005) ("No ... employer can
enjoy a law school's recruiting assistance without certifying that it does not discriminate.").
157. See Second Amended Complaint at 2, Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (03 Civ. 4433) (stating that military recruiters'
discriminatory message "violates the core values [law schools] inculcate in their students and
faculty."); Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 16 (explaining that law schools'
nondiscrimination policies are "designed to inculcate values and to shape the pedagogical
environment"); Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari, supra note 156, at 1
(asserting that law schools have "long been ... institutions with a mission to inculcate a set of
values in their students").
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B. What May Be Taught
Law schools viewed assisting the recruiting efforts of military recruiters as
overturning faculties' pedagogical determination of what to teach. Describing
themselves as "normative institutions," law schools claimed that they have
made the educational decision to teach their students a fundamental principle-13 8
"do not discriminate, do not assist others who discriminate," "no exceptions."
The Solomon Amendment, however, requires law schools to offer military
recruiters the same recruitment services they provide to other employers in
order to keep large amounts of government funding. FAIR's members viewed
teaching nondiscrimination values, while furthering discriminatory recruiting
on campus, as effectively preventing law schools from teaching
nondiscrimination at all.' 59 In essence, law schools claimed that military
recruiting on campus results in a curriculum change.' 60 Because faculties'
decision to adopt nondiscrimination policies is part of a larger effort to
inculcate students with nondiscrimination values, law schools asserted that the
implementation of nondiscrimination policies represents an "exercise of
academic judgment"
protected by universities' academic freedom to determine
6'
teach.'
to
what
FAIR also contended that homosexual students cannot hear law schools'
nondiscrimination message because of the "static" caused by the military's
discriminatory activity. 62 Instead of receiving the law schools' message, FAIR
asserted that students are told that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is not as serious as other forms of illegal discrimination.16 ' Law
158. Brief for the Respondents at 28, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126
S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152).
159. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 13, Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights v. Rumsfeld,
390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433) (asserting the "unremarkable position that when a
school aspires to teach a lesson, the lesson is more effectively communicated when the
messenger is not demonstrably hypocritical"); Brief for the Respondents, supra note 158, at 14
(commenting that some have determined that because of the military recruiters' presence "the
schools are not committed to antidiscrimination, and that the law schools have lost credibility to
preach values of equality, justice, and human dignity").
160. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 6-7,
Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (03
Civ. 4433) (asserting that law faculty are being denied "the fulfillment of [their] educational
mission and the meaningful exercise of [their] own rights of academic freedom").
161. Brief for the American Association of University Professors, supra note 49, at 8.
162. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note
160, at 6.
163. See Brief for Student/Faculty Alliance for Military Equality (SAME) at 21, as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct.
1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152) ("[S]tudents are told that discrimination on the basis of sexual
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schools wished to communicate that employment with the Armed Forces is less
honorable or desirable than employment with other on-campus recruiters, who
do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.164 They believed the
Solomon Amendment precludes the transfer of this idea from "a willing
speaker... to 65
a willing listener," thus undermining their decision regarding
what to teach. 1
C. How It Shall Be Taught
FAIR presented law schools' nondiscrimination policies as the means law
faculties have chosen to teach nondiscrimination values to their students. 166 In
FAIR's view, the Solomon Amendment prevents law schools from refusing to
aid military recruiters. Thus, it hinders law faculties from actualizing the
pedagogical principle that "legal education turns as much on modeling
professional values as it does on formal classroom training.' 67 In effect, FAIR
contended that the enforcement of the law schools' nondiscrimination policies
provides students with an "institutional teacher[]" of law schools' normative
values. 68 Law schools argued that instruction at this level is lost when they
must abide military recruiters' discrimination.
Law schools also asserted that universities' freedom to determine how
their lessons are taught gives them extensive control over their schools'
educational environment.169 Law schools' stated goal is to create an
atmosphere conducive to open discourse, in which individuals feel equal and
orientation is negotiable. As explained by recent graduate Michael Kavey, the message
currently transmitted is that discrimination based on sexual orientation is less objectionable than
other forms of discrimination.").
164. See Brief for the Association of American Law Schools, supra note 3, at 8, 23
(explaining that AALS has established a "fundamental policy condemning discrimination"
because law schools "abhor" "the military's recruiting message").
165. Brief for Student/Faculty Alliance for Military Equality, supra note 163, at 21.
166. See Complaint, supra note 155, at 9 ("The message of diversity and tolerance is
communicated by law schools through... their policies.").
167. Brief for American Association of University Professors at 12, as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006) (No. 04-1152).
168. Brief for the American Association of University Professors, supra note 49, at 19.
169. See Brief for Columbia University et al. at 19-20, as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &Inst. Rights, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 041152) ("The Court has recognized that decisions occurring outside of the classroom can affect
the institutional atmosphere of the university, and '[i]t is the business of a university to provide
that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation."') (citations
omitted).
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respected, and where students are judged solely on the merits of their ideas. In
order for this environment to exist, law schools believe they must offer special
protection to homosexual students. FAIR argued that these students are otherwise
less likely to assert
their views because of the animosity they have experienced in
7
other contexts.' '
Law schools asserted that the introduction ofmilitary recruiters onto campus
shatters the protective environment law schools have constructed for their
homosexual students. FAIR contended that the military's recruiting practices
introduced a foreign element of inequality to campus that effectively stifled
homosexual students' expression. 72 In other words, homosexual students would
no longer feel the safety that allows them to effectively express their views. 73 As
a result, universities' character as facilitator of a wide spectrum of ideas is lost.
Therefore, law schools argued that academic freedom must extend "beyond
teaching and research narrowly understood" to include "the standards and
methods.., faculties bring to bear in shaping the educational environment
outside the classroom."' 74 Law schools thus claimed that the freedom to
determine how to teach grants them almost total authority over campus activities,
including the right to select the kind of"extracurricular student speech that is or
is
75
not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher learning.'

170. See Second Amended Complaint, Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, supranote
157, at 4 ("Only this Court can restore the open environment of equality, mutual respect, and
dignity that law professors and law students have grown to cherish and expect."); Brief for
Appellants, supranote 14, at 20-21 (explaining that law schools seek to create an environment
conducive to "open and honest discourse" where students are "judged [solely] on the merits of
their ideas").
171. See Brief for Student/Faculty Alliance for Military Equality (SAME), supra note 163,
at 20 ("The message of nondiscrimination is crucial to the law school's academic environment,
which was for some students the first place where they could freely express their personal
opinions."); Brief for the Association of American Law Schools, supra note 3, at 26 (indicating
that "individuals with a diversity of backgrounds enrich the discourse and educational energy in
a classroom" and that such "individuals will not participate freely unless their school accords
them equal respect, dignity, and protection from discrimination").
172. See Brief for the Association of American Law Schools, supra note 3, at 19
("[A]betting a discriminatory employer's recruiting efforts undermines the values of the Law
School, and significantly interferes with the quality of the Law School's educational
environment.").
173. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 160, at 6 (claiming that members of the Society of Law Teachers (SALT) have been
"deprived of the ability to engage in the free and open discourse that flows naturally in an
environment where all participants feel equally free to exchange ideas").
174. Brief for American Association of University Professors, supra note 167, at 3-4.
175. Brief for the American Association of University Professors, supra note 49, at 13.
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D. UniversityAutonomy

FAIR stressed that universities are so important to the wellbeing of society
that the Court has recognized that their First Amendment freedoms are
"substantively different... and broader" than those of similar expressive
groups.176 Law schools claimed that the Court has placed particular emphasis
on insulating the academy from external interference. 77 , As a result, they
asserted that universities rights are "more pronounced
and more rigorously
178
safeguarded than the same rights in other contexts."'
The law schools argued that this special protection is manifested in the
Court's reluctance to interfere with the academy's "autonomous decisionmaking." 179 Academic judgment is at its height when it involves an educational
matter and represents faculties' reasoned application of their academic
expertise.
Because law schools believe that the adoption of
nondiscrimination policies meets both of these criteria, they suggested that
these policies were protected by "the First Amendment right to academic
freedom."' 8' Consequently, FAIR asserted that any attempt by the government
to hinder the comprehensive application of law schools' nondiscrimination
policies must fail.
In sum, FAIR claimed that the Solomon Amendment violates law schools'
constitutional academic freedom rights in two different ways. First, it interferes
with the right of universities to determine what and how to teach. Second, it
violates a more general principle of university independence, actualized by the
Court's grant of substantial deference to university's autonomous
decisionmaking.

176. Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 22.
177. See Brief for Columbia University et al., supra note 169, at 19 (summarizing the
Court's precedents as mandating "great respect for faculty's professional judgment" when others
attack their decisions regarding how best to advance the university's academic mission).
178. Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 22
179. Brief for Robert A. Burt et al. at 18, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152).
180. See Brief for Columbia University et al., supra note 169, at 4 (emphasizing the
Grutter Court's "deference to the university's views of how best to shape its educational
atmosphere and to advance its mission"); Brief for the American Association of University
Professors, supra note 49, at 8 (describing the schools' nondiscrimination policies as "a result of
considered deliberation by the law schools' faculties" and "an exercise of academic judgment on
the part of the faculties of the law schools concerned" and thus covered by the "First
Amendment right to academic freedom").
181. Brief for the American Association of University Professors, supra note 49, at 8.
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V. StretchingAcademic Freedom
Academic freedom formed a central bulwark of the law schools'
argumentation.182 However, the law schools' assessment of both the Solomon
Amendment and constitutional academic freedom is deeply flawed. This Part
attempts to show that neither public policy, First Amendment principles, nor
the Court's academic freedom case law support law schools' attempts to
exclude or marginalize speakers with whom they happen to disagree.
A. Academic Freedom & Public Policy
The public policy justification for both professional and constitutional
academic freedom has always been related to the benefits academic freedom
provides to society as a whole.18 3 The AAUP in its early years characterized
the benefits of professional academic freedom as furthering democracy by
teaching citizens to think and by providing neutral expert opinion for public
consumption. 1 4 Later, the Supreme Court justified incorporating academic
freedom into the First Amendment in much the same way.18 5 First, academic
freedom promotes the search for truth by training individuals to think for
themselves. Justice Marshall described this aspect of a university's role as "the
dual responsibility to advance... knowledge through unfettered inquiry and
debate... and to produce a citizenry willing and able to involve itself in the
governance of the polity.' 8 6 Second, academic freedom in public schools
introduces students to ideological dispute, thus impressing upon them the value
of intellectual autonomy.8 7
The type of university FAIR described does not benefit society in either of
these ways. Law schools seemed to view universities as little more than the
182. See Horwitz, supra note 27, at 518 (noting that FAIR's complaint is "replete with
language about law schools' educational missions, the 'pedagogical value' of the schools'
policy regarding on-campus recruiters ... and the schools' interest in nurtur[ing] the sort of
environment for free and open discourse that is the hallmark of the academy") (citations
omitted).
183. See supra Part II.B-C (exploring the rationales offered to justify academic freedom).
184. See supra Part II.B (discussing the AAUP's initial justifications for academic
freedom).
185. See supra Part II.C (explaining why the Supreme Court believes academic freedom is
important for American society).
186. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 293 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
187. See supra Part II.C (detailing the importance of intellectual autonomy and mental
flexibility to the Court's conception of constitutional academic freedom).
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88
instruments of their faculty in furthering a divisive ideological agenda.,
Thus, they emphasized the private, rather than the public, utility of
universities. Instead of focusing on teaching students to think, law schools
emphasized their right to inculcate students with their ideal that any
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong. 8 9 Competing
views are discredited by process of elimination.' 90 Rejecting the
marketplace of ideas model, law schools, in this context, associated
ideological dispute with offense' 9' or verbal static that hinders the
inculcation of their moral truth.192 FAIR's member schools thus sought to
teach students not to respect intellectual autonomy but to associate
ideological neutrality with hypocrisy. 193 Law schools have thus claimed all
the rights of constitutional academic freedom without accepting any of its
corresponding social responsibilities.
In order to make their associational claims more convincing, law
schools presented themselves as the type of proprietary schools that the
AAUP's 1915 Declaration recognized could never legitimately claim the
benefits of academic freedom. The drafters of the Declaration drew a
fundamental distinction between such "proprietary" universities and
"ordinary institutions of learning."' 94 Proprietary schools are "designed for
the propagation of specific doctrines," while ordinary institutions recognize
academic freedom and do not impose "restrictions upon ... intellectual

188. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 2 ("The purpose of these antidiscrimination policies is to teach law students that invidious discrimination is a moral
wrong.... ."); Brief for the Respondents, supra note 158, at 3 ("Law schools are, and define
themselves as normative institutions.").
189. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 16 (stating that law schools'
nondiscrimination policies are "designed to inculcate values"); Brief for the Respondents, supra
note 158, at 28 ("The academy is a normative institution. By adopting and living by an
antidiscrimination policy, a law school instills a lesson in its students and its community: 'We
do not discriminate. We do not assist other who discriminate. No exceptions."').
190. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari, supra note 156, at 19 ("Law
schools have established an even stronger right to exclude the unwelcome messenger from their
forum than either the parade organizers or the Boy Scouts.").
191. See id. at 14 (stating that law schools find the military's recruiting message "deeply
offensive").
192. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note
160, at 6 (claiming that students "cannot hear the law schools' message of non-discrimination
free from the static caused by the Solomon Amendment").
193. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 14 (citing "student expressions of cynicism
and cries of hypocrisy when the lessons turn to topics such as equality, [and] human dignity" as
necessitating law schools' enforcement of discrimination policies against military recruiters).
194. AM. ASS'N OF UNW. PRoFEssoRs, supra note 45, at 293.
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freedom.' ' 95 The AAUP's 1940 Statement, which forms the foundation of
its current view of academic freedom, maintained this distinction, declaring
that universities entitled to academic freedom are "conducted for the
common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher
or the institution as a whole."'196
Although they all presumably represent nonsectarian institutions,
FAIR's members attempted to redefine themselves as "normative" or
97
proprietary schools in order to justify their enforcement of a moral view. 1
Academic freedom in the United States arose in an age in which the vast
majority of scholars were dedicated to the scientific model and saw
themselves as engaged in an incremental search for truth. 98 When it comes
to the question of selectivity based upon sexual orientation, however, law
schools have chosen to trade this search for truth for dogmatism and critical
inquiry for the indoctrination of a moral view. 199 Society has little reason
to grant public privileges to schools that claim such a sectarian purpose.
As the drafters of the AAUP's Declaration recognized, proprietary
institutions are "strictly bound ... to a propagandist duty" and may not
"appeal[] to the general public for support." 200 In other words, FAIR's
members do not merit academic freedom privileges because they are not
performing the important social function of teaching students to judge
policies and events for themselves. 20 1 Public policy, therefore, does not
support granting constitutional academic freedom rights to universities that
seek to inculcate moral or political truths.
In sum, academic freedom rights are justified by their utility to society
as a whole. FAIR's vision of academic freedom only profits law schools as
private institutions in furthering their own ideological ends. Public policy,
therefore, does not support law schools' claims to institutional autonomy.
In fact, law schools' abrogation of their traditional social functions would
seem to invite more external regulation of their internal affairs, not less.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 3.
197. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 158, at 3.
198. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PRoFEssoRs, supranote 45, at 295 ("[T]he first condition of
progress is complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results. Such
freedom is the breath in the nostrils of all scientific activity.").
199. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 158, at 29 ("Thou shalt not assist
discrimination.").
200. AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 45, at 293.
201. See id. at 297 (highlighting universities' function in making "public opinion more
self-critical and more circumspect").
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B. FirstAmendment Principles

There are two primary applications of the First Amendment-the way it
applies to government actors and the way it applies to everyone else. Private
individuals and groups may utilize the First Amendment to promote their views
through speech and association free from governmental interference. 20 2 They
exercise these freedoms against the government in its regulatory capacity,
which the First Amendment commands to be ideologically neutral.20 3 Thus,
First Amendment rights are not normally ascribed to government actors. Public
universities' exercise of academic freedom is a special case.2 °4 Public
universities' particular mission, to serve as society's unconstrained
marketplaces of ideas, justifies this exceptional treatment.20 5 Constitutional
academic freedom, therefore, shields public universities from direct state
control, enabling them to embody physically the First Amendment principle of
governmental neutrality in the realm of ideas.
Law schools' conception of constitutional academic freedom eviscerates
this ideological neutrality.206 Because academic freedom gained constitutional
significance as a special concern of the First Amendment, however, any
legitimate interpretation of this right will reflect essential First Amendment
values.20 7 As applied to the government as regulator, the First Amendment
embodies the principle that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein., 20 8 Prescribing an
orthodox opinion, however, is exactly what public law schools in the FAIR
case attempted to do. FAIR recognized that the morality of discriminating
against homosexuals in employment is one of the "most divisive ...issues of
202. But see W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("[P]ublic
education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political neutrality, will not be
partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction.").
203. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the heart of the
First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.").
204. See Byrne, supranote 36, at 300 ("A state university is a unique state entity in that it
enjoys federal constitutional rights against the state itself.").
205. See supraPart III.D (explaining the special nature and function of public universities).
206. See Brief for Appellants, supranote 14, at 25 ("The District Court had no doubt that
law schools' recruiting policies are a means of inculcating the law schools' value system....").
207. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (characterizing
academic freedom as an unenumerated "special concern ofthe First Amendment"); Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (same).
208. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
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our time. '0 09 Nonetheless, law schools have instituted nondiscrimination
policies that enforce their belief that this form of employment discrimination is
wrong.2 '0 Law professors, as individuals, are certainly entitled to this belief. It
is a moral opinion, however, with which reasonable people can and do disagree.
As arms of the state, public law schools may not force students to "confess by
word or act their faith" in nondiscrimination policies.21'
Academic freedom, as a First Amendment doctrine, cannot justify the
enforcement of law schools' moral views. FAIR's members made very clear
that they believe assisting discrimination against homosexuals, in any way, is
wrong.21 2 Therefore, employers who run afoul of these policies are banned
from on-campus recruiting.213 Public law schools, however, have no power to
prescribe orthodox views regarding homosexuality or any other matter of
opinion. 21 4 If the First Amendment's mandate of governmental neutrality in the
realm of ideas has any meaning, students may not be denied employment
opportunities because their morality does not mirror that of their teachers. The
First Amendment gives students the right to decide moral issues for
themselves. 21 5 Therefore, public law schools may not construct an artificial
marketplace of ideas by sifting out potential employers who express viewpoints
with which they disagree. Fostering competing ideas on campus may make
some students uncomfortable.2 16 For "[a]ny word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person
may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
209. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 158, at 1.
210. See id. at 19 ("The lesson is not just about the injustice of discrimination, but also
about the immorality of assisting others who discriminate.").
211. Barnette,319 U.S. at 642.
212. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 158, at 4 ("[A]ffirmatively assisting the
discrimination of others is immoral."); id. at 28 ("We do not assist others who discriminate. No
exceptions.").
213. See id. at 5 ("[L]aw schools will not provide these communicative services to any
employer... that discriminates on any other basis that the law school considers invidious.").
214. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 579 (1995) ("The very idea that.., speech restriction be used to produce thoughts and
statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment, for
it amounts to ... a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech
Clause has no more certain antithesis.").
215. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,641 (1994) ("At the heart of the
First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.").
216. See Part IV.C. (describing law schools' belief that they must offer special protection
to homosexual students). But see Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 ("[T]he point of all speech
protection.., is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or
even hurtful.").
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must take this risk.' 2 17 Therefore, academic freedom, as a First Amendment
right, cannot support law schools' viewpoint discrimination.
In short, the First Amendment's command that government remain neutral
in the realm of ideas constrains public law schools as it does every other branch
of government. Enforcing moral orthodoxy regarding a controversial matter of
opinion violates this neutrality principle. Accordingly, constitutional academic
freedom is incapable of supporting law schools' exclusion of dissenting moral
views.
C. Academic Freedom Case Law
Law schools' assertion of near total control over every aspect of the
academic environment is constitutionally problematic. FAIR's academic
freedom analysis is unconvincing because it fails to take into account that
different constitutional rights apply to its private and public school members or
that its interpretation of constitutional academic freedom would nullify
students' longstanding First Amendment rights. This section attempts to show
that both of these considerations argue against the acceptance of law schools'
view of constitutional academic freedom.
1. The Public-PrivateDistinction
The law schools' academic freedom claims are unpersuasive because they
fail to account for the different constitutional rights that apply to public and
private universities. FAIR is a private organization composed of both public
and private law schools or their faculties. 21 8 Members of FAIR claimed that the
Solomon Amendment infringed their academic freedom and associational
rights. 219 However, the Supreme Court has never applied constitutional
217. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982).
218. See supra Part I (describing FAIR's nature and membership); see also Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, supra note 13 (listing the total number of faculties and
institutions which are public). The members of FAIR identified publicly are the faculties ofthe
schools of law of Capital University, Chicago-Kent College, the City University of New York,
DePaul University, the University of the District of Columbia, Fordham University, Georgetown
University, Hofstra University, the John Marshall School of Law, the University of Minnesota,
Pace University, the University of Puerto Rico, Roger Williams University, the University of
San Francisco, Stanford University, Suffolk University, Washington University, Whittier Law
School, as well as the institutions of George Washington University Law School, Golden Gate
University School of Law, New York Law School, New York University School of Law,
Northeastern University School of Law, and Vermont Law School. Id.
219. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 30 ("[T]he government regulation in this
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academic freedom to private universities, nor the freedom of association to
public schools. 220 As has been explained earlier, institutional constitutional
academic freedom and associational rights are mutually exclusive.2
Constitutional academic freedom insulates public universities from
direct state control in order to prevent partisan politics from skewing the
marketplace of ideas and thus individuals' autonomous search for truth. The
Court has ascribed constitutional academic freedom rights to public
universities because they may not claim the associational freedoms that
provide private universities with this protection.222 Public schools lack
associational rights because they are subject to governmental norms of
ideological neutrality, which effectively prevent them from adopting and
enforcing a particular viewpoint. Conversely, private universities do not
need constitutional academic freedom because they naturally possess ordinary
First Amendment protections against government interference. 2 3 This
includes the right of association, which the Third Circuit deemed potent
224
enough on its own to justify the invalidation of the Solomon Amendment.
FAIR thus exaggerated law schools' First Amendment interests by asserting
duplicative rights. Law schools may assert either constitutional academic
freedom or associational rights against government interference, but they may
not claim both.
Public law school professors could argue that they are asserting their
personal associational freedom in excluding recruiters who screen student
applicants by their sexual orientation. Any such association would
necessarily be completely private in nature, however, and could not bind
public universities as institutions or the students within their walls. It is
case calls into play three distinct constitutional rights-academic freedom, freedom of speech,
and freedom of expressive association.").
220. See supra Part III.D (explaining the different constitutional rights of public and
private universities); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) ("[G]iven the
importance of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated
with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition.") (emphasis added).
221. See supra Part III.D (explicating why constitutional academic freedom should be
viewed as a limited form of the freedom of association granted to public universities).
222. See supra Part III.D (describing the different rights that apply to public and private
schools).
223. See supraPart III.C-D (discussing public universities' insulation from governmental
interference).
224. See Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3d Cir.
2004) ("We rely on the doctrines of expressive association and compelled speech to conclude
that FAIR has made the requisite showing of a likelihood of success on the merits in support of
its motion for a preliminary injunction.").
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beyond question that associations of government employees cannot assume
total control over government entities, thus invalidating the constitutional
rights all citizens hold against their government.2 25 In their institutional
capacity, public law schools are subject to the same First Amendment
constraint of governmental neutrality in the realm of ideas that binds every
other branch of government.226
Because FAIR is a private organization and the Court has only applied
constitutional academic freedom to government entities, its ability to raise
constitutional academic freedom claims is questionable.2 27 In the future, the
Court could determine that government funding subjects private universities
to some governmental norms.228 In any case, FAIR's claims to constitutional
academic freedom are worth addressing because any public university could
validly raise them at any time. Because this Note argues that constitutional
academic freedom rights are not cognizable outside of the public school
context, it broaches academic freedom only as applied to those members of
FAIR that represent public schools.
To summarize, constitutional academic freedom applies only to public
universities as a grant of limited autonomy to the academic arm of the state.
Constitutional academic freedom thus fulfills a function substantially similar
to that the freedom of association provides private schools. As a result, law
schools may not claim both associational and constitutional academic
freedoms.
225. Cf Brief for the Christian Legal Society, supranote 31, at 8 (questioning how "lower
courts [would] adjudicate the free speech claims asserted against public institutions by...
unwanted speakers" if public law schools have the right of expressive association).
226. See Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006) (ordering
the issuance of a preliminary injunction to restore the Christian Legal Society's status as a
registered student organization, which was revoked because Southern Illinois University alleged
this group violated its nondiscrimination policies).
227. See supra Part I (discussing the nature and membership of FAIR).
228. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 581 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that private schools might be subjected to public school norms ifthrough "financing
or other umbilical cords they become instrumentalities of the State"); see also Marty B.
Lorenzo, Race-ConsciousDiversityAdmissions Programs:Furtheringa CompellingInterest,2
MICH. J. RACE & L. 361,384 n. 116 (1997) ("[P]rivate schools that receive federal funding most
likely must adhere to Title VI."); John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy
Preferencesat HarvardandYale, 26 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 491,507 (1993) (stating that
the Department of Education's construction of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits "action
that has the effect of discriminating against persons due to race, religion, or national origin").
Private schools could be subject to governmental neutrality norms through statute. It could be
argued, for example, that private law schools' disparate treatment of students whose morality
differs from their own, for religious reasons, constitutes discrimination based on religion in
violation of Title VI.
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2. The Essential Freedoms of a University
Law schools maintained that the Solomon Amendment trespasses upon
universities' traditional rights to determine what and how to teach. They
viewed assisting the military's discriminatory recruiting as irreparably
impairing their ability to communicate nondiscrimination values. 229 However,
all recruiting is "discriminatory" in that certain students are hired and others are
not. Most often these decisions are based upon students' school affiliation,
geographic ties, personal connections, and other factors that are arguably as
poor predictors of students' job performance as their sexual orientation. Law
schools, however, fail to explain why discriminating against students based on
their sexual orientation is more harmful to their pedagogical designs than the
discrimination they tolerate, which is based on a host of other immaterial
grounds. Such inconsistency suggests that law schools are really only
concerned about discrimination against certain favored groups.23 °
FAIR asserted that facilitating military recruiting effectively prevents law
schools from teaching nondiscrimination values. 231 By their very nature,
voluntary learning activities that take place outside of the classroom, in this
case interviews with military recruiters, do not affect what professors teach.
The Solomon Amendment does not preclude professors from dedicating all of
their classroom hours, from torts to civil procedure, to expounding upon their
vision ofnondiscrimination. 32 Consequently, the Solomon Amendment cannot
be said to inhibit the transmission of the law schools' message. FAIR's true
complaint, therefore, must center on something other than the impact of
discriminatory speakers upon what law schools teach.
Law schools' real concern is that students will not accept their
nondiscrimination message as readily if competing viewpoints are available.2 33
Constitutional academic freedom, however, does not give universities the
power to enforce students' acceptance of their views. The danger of competing
conceptions of truth is inherent in the Court's model of the public university as
229. See supra Part IV (presenting FAIR's academic freedom arguments).
230. A few law schools have attempted to address this problem by instituting a lottery
system to place students in initial interviews with legal recruiters. See, e.g., Brief for 56
Columbia Law School Faculty Members at 2, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, No. 04-1152 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 2005)
(describing Columbia's lottery system for assigning screening interviews to students and
employers).
231. See supra Part IV.B (summarizing this argument).
232. See supra Part I (summarizing the effects of the Solomon Amendment).
233. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 13 (stating that "[t]he message is not
getting through").
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society's marketplace of ideas. 4 In this unique forum ideas vie continually for
acceptance, leaving individuals free to choose what they believe for
themselves.23 5 Law schools' failure to convince undecided students of the
rightness of their view, to change the stance of those who disagree, or to
persuade those who agree with them of their sincerity does not mean that the
law schools' message has been changed. 36 Instead, it reflects the simple fact
that students have not accepted the "lesson" law schools wish to teach. 7
Therefore, fostering dissenting voices on campus does not impair law schools'
constitutional academic freedom to determine what to teach.
FAIR also contended that the Solomon Amendment prevents law schools
from determining how their lessons are taught. 238 Law schools posit that
excluding dissenting speakers, at an institutional level, is the means they have
chosen to teach nondiscrimination values. 239 However, the First Amendment
constrains public law schools from discriminating against speakers on the basis
of viewpoint. 240 The Solomon Amendment does nothing more than promote
the ideological neutrality the Constitution demands. Public law schools cannot
reasonably claim that the right to determine how to teach allows them to
circumvent the Constitution's ban on government's prescription of orthodoxy
in matters of opinion. 24 1 Accordingly, constitutional academic freedom cannot
234. See supra Part II.C (summarizing the Court's justification of constitutional academic
freedom).
235. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("[T]he classroom is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.") (citations omitted).
236. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 14 ("Faculty attest to student expressions
of cynicism and cries of hypocrisy when the lessons turn to topics such as equality, human
dignity, and other underpinnings of ajust society.").
237. Students who wish to interview with military recruiters have necessarily rejected
FAIR's view of discrimination. That does not mean that they have not heard the law schools'
message. It simply indicates that they have not accepted it. The same is true of students who
oppose the "Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy" and decry their schools' purported support of military
recruiters.
238. See supraPart IV.C (summarizing this argument).
239. See Brief for the American Association of University Professors, supra note 49, at 19
(presenting the theory that law schools serve as "institutional teachers of professional
responsibility.").
240. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,637 (1943) ("[P]ublic education,
if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political neutrality, will not be partisan or
enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction.").
241. See id. at 642 ("[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.").
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justify the destruction of public universities' nature as society's free
marketplaces of ideas.
In essence, law schools are concerned not with how their students are
taught but with what their students do. 242 Law schools' power over instruction
inside the classroom and their authority over students' voluntary learning
activities outside of the classroom, however, are two very different things.
FAIR's true grievance was not that dissenting voices changed how law schools
teach but that these speakers' presence on campus allows students to exhibit
openly their rejection of law schools' nondiscriminatory lesson. Law
professors may well find some students' ideological stance distasteful. 243 The
First Amendment, however, gives law students the right to judge the morality
of distinctions based on sexual orientation for themselves. 244 Contravention of
students' moral autonomy cannot form part of law schools' constitutional
academic freedom to determine how to teach.
In sum, the Solomon Amendment affects not what law schools teach or
how they teach it but what students are able to show they believe by whom they
choose to associate with outside of the classroom walls. Law schools sought to
protect not their pedagogy but their sensibilities by marginalizing or excluding
speakers, here military recruiters, who violated their moral norms. However,
because public law schools cannot prescribe moral orthodoxy, excluding
dissenting viewpoints is never a legitimate pedagogical concern. Consequently,
the Solomon Amendment does not violate public schools' rights to institutional
academic freedom.
3. The Academic Environment
Law schools asserted a broad right of control over the school environment
as part of their right to determine how to teach, including the ability to regulate
extensively student activity outside the classroom. 245 The Court, however, has
242. Cf Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1307 (2006)
("[T]he Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must
do... not what they may or may not say.").

243. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 10, Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights v.
Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433) (relating the government's allegation that
"potential recruits were harassed and detained by protestors; and their pictures were displayed
throughout the school on a poster entitled 'Face of Complicity"').
244. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the heart of the
First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.").
245. See supraPart IV.C (summarizing this argument); Brief for American Association of
University Professors, supra note 167, at 9 ("Academic freedom extends also to admissions,
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made it clear that students do not shed their constitutional freedoms by
enrolling in a public school. 246 While public school officials have wide-ranging
power over the classroom environment, their authority even there is not
absolute. 47 Outside of the compulsory environment of the classroom, this
authority is even more limited. 48
In Board of Education v. Pico, the Court rejected a secondary school's
sweeping claims to control over students' voluntary learning activities outside
of the classroom.2 4 9 Three justices in dissent, although they disagreed with the
Court's holding in the secondary school context, affirmed that the government
is subject to greater educational restrictions in the university setting. 5 ° Public
schools' assertion of total authority over the recruiters students contact on
campus would fail First Amendment scrutiny even in the high school context.
University students naturally possess even greater personal and intellectual
freedoms. Thus, students' academic freedom limits the ability of public law
schools to control opportunities for education and association outside of the
classroom walls.25 '
extracurricular activities, evaluation criteria, and the academic values that universities seek to
impart to their students throughout the educational environment. The Solomon Amendment
improperly displaces academic freedom in this larger sense.").
246. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can
hardly be argued that either students or teacher shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)
("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.").
247. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 862 (1982) ("Our adjudication of the present
case thus does not intrude into the classroom, or into the compulsory courses taught there.");
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 ("A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours."); see also Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988) (distinguishing
between a school's regulation of students' "personal expression that happens to occur on...
school premises" and "educators' authority over school-sponsored... expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school").
248. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (finding the school board's belief that its authority to
inculcate values extended beyond the "compulsory environment of the classroom" "misplaced").
249. See id. ("Petitioners might well defend their.., absolute discretion in matters of
curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate.., values.... [R]eliance upon that duty is
misplaced where... their claim of absolute discretion [extends] beyond the compulsory
environment of the classroom, into the... library and the... voluntary inquiry that there holds
sway.").
250. See id.at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It must also be recognized that the
government as educator is subject to fewer strictures when operating an elementary and
secondary school system than when operating an institution of higher learning.").
251. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (stating that a public university may
not "restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to
be abhorrent").
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Furthermore, the interests law schools have asserted to justify their almost
total control over the university environment cannot withstand First
Amendment scrutiny.252 Public law schools may not proscribe ideas in order to
eliminate the discomfort some students may feel as a result of their exposure to
conflicting views. 2 3 Constitutional academic freedom has been enforced by
the Court to protect the expression of unpopular viewpoints.254 Therefore, First
Amendment academic freedom cannot support the efforts of public university
officials to filter unsettling ideas from the educational sphere.
Law schools claimed that their exclusion of ideas, in the form of military
recruiters, enables them to construct a veritable Eden in which all students feel
equal and are judged solely on the merits of their ideas.2 55 Enforcement of
moral orthodoxy, however, makes such a utopian environment impossible.
Inequality necessarily results from law schools' nondiscrimination policies
because some students are bound to disagree with their institutions' moral
views. Rather than providing a neutral platform for the exchange of ideas, as is
their constitutional mandate, FAIR's public school members have decided to
enforce a moral truth.256 In this context, these schools are simply incapable of
judging students who disagree with their moral perspective on the merits of
their ideas. Regardless of their reasoning, law schools have established that
certain students are wrong and others are right.257 Constitutional academic
freedom, which seeks to establish a marketplace of ideas from which

252. See supra Part IV.C (summarizing FAIR's claims to control over the academic
environment).
253. See Brief for the Association of American Law Schools, supra note 3, at 26
(indicating that "individuals with a diversity of backgrounds enrich the discourse and
educational energy in a classroom" and that such "individuals will not participate freely unless
their school accords them equal respect, dignity, and protection from discrimination").
254. See supra Part III.A-B (discussing national and state governments' targeting of
professors with socialist or communist views and school officials' hostility to secondary schools
students' protest of the Vietnam War).
255. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 160, at 6 (claiming that FAIR's members have been "deprived of the ability to engage in
the free and open discourse that flows naturally in an environment where all participants feel
equally free to exchange ideas"); Brief for Appellants, supranote 14, at 20-21 (stating that the
law schools have attempted to construct an environment in which students are "judged on the
merits of their ideas and not on bases that the law school assures them are irrelevant").
256. But see Cameron et al., supra note 142, at 270 (summarizing AAUP documents
stating that professors should not "introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has
no relation to their subject... [or] evaluate students on... irrelevant matters such as
personality, race, religion, degree of political activism, or personal beliefs") (citations omitted).
257. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 158, at 29 ("Thou shalt not assist
discrimination.").
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individuals may freely choose, cannot support the establishment and
enforcement of moral orthodoxy by an arm of the state.25
Furthermore, some students' disagreement with law schools' view of
nondiscrimination is grounded in deeply held religious beliefs.25 9 Law schools
tell these students not only that their ideas are wrong but that their religion is
wrong. 260 The First Amendment, however, requires public schools to be
neutral between "religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion. ''2 61 The derecognition of religious student groups in recent years,
however, shows that public law schools are anything but "neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice. 2 62 Constitutional academic freedom,
as a First Amendment doctrine, cannot justify conduct that contravenes the Free
Exercise or Establishment clauses, which form part of the core of the First
Amendment. Consequently, constitutional academic freedom cannot support
public schools' hostility towards some students' religious beliefs.26 3
In short, the Court instituted constitutional academic freedom not only to
preserve universities' character as marketplaces of ideas but to protect students'
ability to choose from these competing viewpoints. Law schools have sculpted
their presentation of institutional academic freedom, however, to allow them to
exclude ideas they find unpalatable from campus, thus inhibiting the
autonomous inquiry of students with differing views. Students' own
constitutional freedoms prohibit such attempts by public schools to inhibit
students' intellectual and moral autonomy.
4. Deference
FAIR emphasized the Court's recognition of a general principle of
university autonomy and argued that this principle requires that courts grant

258. See supraPart IL.C (discussing the rationale informing the Court's academic freedom
case law).
259. See Brief for the Christian Legal Society, supra note 31, at 13, (discussing law
schools' hostility to some religious students' view of homosexuality, which is grounded in
''sincere religious beliefs").
260. See, e.g., Brief for Robert A. Burt et al.,supranote 179, at 15 ("The military, the Boy
Scouts and some religious institutions continue to openly and deliberately discriminate against
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.").
261. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
262. Id. at 103-04.
263. See Brief for the Christian Legal Society, supranote 31, at 11-12 (describing public
law schools' hostility towards religious student groups because they allegedly discriminate on
the basis of religion and sexual orientation).
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substantial deference to universities' independent judgments. 264 The Court,
however, has never deferred automatically to a university's assertion of the
valid application of its own expertise.2 65 Judicial deference hinges upon the
Court's independent determination that266a university's decision is a result of
"legitimate academic decisionmaking."
Furthermore, the deference the Court has granted universities'
decisionmaking has never been greater than that which it has applied to other
government agencies within their respective realms of expertise. Law schools'
claim of the Court's extreme deference to academic judgment is an illusion
formed by FAIR's dual assertion of academic freedom and associational rights.
The Third Circuit made this clear when it stated that the Court's academic
freedom jurisprudence underscored the importance of granting deference to law
schools' independent determination of what impairs their associational
expression. 67 As has been noted previously, however, the Court has never
applied constitutional academic freedom to private universities nor the right of
association to public schools. Because these First Amendment rights serve the
same general purpose-in two different contexts-FAIR's claims to
extraordinary insulation from external regulation are essentially baseless.268
Law schools' emphasis of the moral nature of their quarrel with those they
see as discriminators reveals that their nondiscrimination policies are not the
result of legitimate academic decisionmaking. At its core, law schools' hostility
toward those who do not share their ideological views is based upon moral
indignation and not academic judgment. 269 For example, law schools utilized a
surprising number of religious terms in staking out their legal position. They
described the communication of their nondiscrimination values in terms of
264. See supra Part IV.C (presenting FAIR's claims to institutional autonomy). But see
supra Part IIL.C (describing the limits the Court has placed upon deference to academic
judgment).
265. See Brief for Columbia University et al., supra note 169, at 22 (stating that the
Court's precedent recognizes "the importance ofjudicial deference to the university's views of
how best to shape its educational atmosphere and to advance its mission").
266. Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990).
267. See Forum for Academic& Inst. Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219,233 n.13 (3d Cir.
2004) ("The Supreme Court's academic freedom jurisprudence thus underscores the importance
of Dale deference in our case.").
268. See supraParts IIl.D, V.C. 1 (explaining how the institutional academic freedom of
public schools serves essentially the same purposes as private schools' right of association).
269. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 155, at 3 ("[I]nvidious discrimination is a moral
wrong.... ."); Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 2 ("The purpose of these antidiscrimination policies is to teach law students that invidious discrimination is a moral
wrong .... "); Brief for the Respondents, supra note 158, at 4 ("As law schools see it,
affirmatively assisting the discrimination of others is immoral.").
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preaching, reformulated their nondiscrimination policies in the guise of
commandments, and further characterized their belief in terms of an article of
faith.27 ° Members of the academy, however, possess no special competence to
declare moral truth. Individual morality consists of an inherently subjective
ordering of competing values that has but a secondary relationship to logical
analysis. The promulgation of nondiscrimination policies thus falls well
outside the realm of academic expertise. Consequently, law schools'
enforcement
of nondiscrimination policies should not be given deference by a
27 1
court.

In brief, universities have never received greater deference from the Court
than any other government agency within its sphere of competence. Deference
to universities' decisionmaking hinges upon a valid application of professorial
expertise. Universities' nondiscrimination policies are not a function of
legitimate academic decisionmaking. Consequently, their enforcement of
nondiscrimination policies is particularly undeserving ofjudicial respect.
5. Academic Freedom of the Student
The Court has envisioned universities as institutional guardians of an
almost sacrosanct realm dedicated to freedom of inquiry and expression.2 72
Instead of fostering an environment conducive to autonomous intellectual
inquiry, law schools stated that it is their mission to inculcate students with a
moral view. 273 The Court, however, developed constitutional academic
freedom to protect two things-universities' character as true marketplaces of
ideas and individuals' freedom of speech and thought.274 Consequently,

270. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 14,at 13 ("[T]he law school has lost credibility to
preach values of equality, justice, and human dignity.") (emphasis added); Brief for the
Respondents, supra note 158, at 29-30 (describing the law schools' moral position as "Thou
shalt not assist discrimination" and stating that the "refusal to assist discriminatory
employers ...has been an explicit and earnest article offaith among law schools for decades")
(emphasis added).
271. See supra Part III.C (examining the limitations the Court has placed on granting
deference to universities' decisions).
272. See supra Part II.C (sketching the Court's vision of the underlying basis for
constitutional academic freedom).
273. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari, supra note 156, at 1 (stating
that law schools have "long been institutions with a mission to inculcate a set of values in their
students").
274. See supra Part II.C (describing the importance of these factors to the Court's view of
constitutional academic freedom).
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constitutional academic freedom cannot support public universities'
marginalization and exclusion of those with competing moral viewpoints.
Furthermore, public universities' institutional academic freedom rights
cannot justify the infraction of students' own academic freedoms, which the
Court has erected as a bulwark against ideological coercion.27 5 Law schools
posited that academic freedom gives them the right to control what their
students see and hear, not only in the classroom but in the academic
environment as a whole.27 6 Encasing students in a zone in which they may only
hear the law schools' message, however, is not a constitutional way for law
schools to convince law students of the correctness of their nondiscrimination
views. Tinker established that "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
2 77
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.
Institutional academic freedom, therefore, cannot give public universities the
right to construct a stacked marketplace of ideas, limited to the moral
viewpoints law faculties find to be acceptable.
Public universities are subject to the fundamental limitation the First
Amendment imposes on all coercive governmental power-the individual right
to choose. As the Court stated in a different context, "[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable. '278 "The way to preserve [equality] ...is not to
punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them
that they are wrong."279 This persuasion, however, must take place in a true
marketplace of ideas that provides a full spectrum of viewpoints. 8
Constitutional academic freedom may give law professors the opportunity to
convince students of the correctness of their moral views, but it does not
empower them to enforce these views on students who continue to disagree.
Furthermore, the Court has affirmed students' "right to receive
information and ideas.",28 ' The Court has justified this right as a "necessary
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
275. See supra Part III.B (summarizing the Court's student academic freedom cases).
276. See Brief for the American Association of University Professors, supra note 49, at 19
("[T]he total learning environment influences what students learn.") (citations omitted).
277. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
278. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
279. Id. at 419.
280. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ("The College classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas'... ."); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967) ("[T]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."').
281. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,867 (1982).
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press, and political freedom. 2 82 Because political speech forms the core of the
First Amendment, it is important to consider the political ramifications of
public universities' selective exclusion of views. In seeking to inculcate
students with a moral viewpoint, law schools engage in much more than a
theoretical discussion of the value of nondiscrimination. Rather, they hope to
indoctrinate students with a truth that necessarily entails sweeping political
consequences. Depriving students who are considering the appropriateness of
the "Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy," or those who disagree with law schools'
position, of the ability to hear contrasting opinions denies these students a
political freedom. As such, it impairs students' ability to decide this important
issue for themselves. The First Amendment was "fashioned to assure the
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people., 28 3 It cannot support the elimination of ideas in
order to indoctrinate students with a positive view of the political and social
changes desired by professors in public universities, who are agents of the
state. 2 4 Students' academic and political freedoms mandate that public law
schools, at the very least, tolerate the ideas their students wish to hear and
express.285
Denying access and services to recruiters who do not share law schools'
moral ideology also impinges upon students' freedom to learn through the
exercise of their associational rights. Healy clearly held that public universities
may not "restrict speech or association simply because they find the views
expressed by any group to be abhorrent. 28 6 FAIR's public school members
have excluded "discriminatory" voices precisely because they find their
message offensive and abhorrent.28 7 Students' ability to engage in speech and
282. Id.
283. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
284. But see Brief for the Respondents, supranote 158, at 3 ("Law schools are, and define
themselves as normative institutions. They aspire to shape future lawyers who can profoundly
change our society, its mores and values. . . and who will urge their visions ofjustice on society
at large.").
285. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511(1969) (stating
that students "may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved" and noting that "school officials cannot suppress expressions of feelings with which
they do not wish to contend") (citations omitted). But see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (noting that the First
Amendment allows private groups to choose "what not to say").
286. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972).
287. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari, supra note 156, at 14
(describing JAG officers' conversations with students as disseminating "a recruiting message
that [FAIR] finds deeply offensive"); Brief for the Respondents, supranote 158, at 32 (stating
that the law schools find the military's discrimination against homosexuals "abhorrent").
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association with some legal recruiters through employment is thus restricted
because law schools find these students' moral views to be repugnant. When
universities' interests in institutional control conflict with students' free
expression, however, "the First Amendment... strikes the
288 required balance"
and students' freedoms of belief and expression prevail.
In summary, the Court has always understood constitutional academic
freedom to maximize intellectual autonomy and freedom of expression. In
keeping with this goal, it has granted students substantial academic freedom
rights. Public law schools' claims to absolute authority over the school
environment are thus unconvincing because the exercise ofthis authority would
necessarily infringe upon students' own First Amendment rights.
D. Summary of Arguments

Both public policy and the First Amendment principle of governmental
neutrality in the realm of ideas mandate that public universities operate as zones
of free expression, allowing students to reap the benefits of exposure to diverse
views. Experiencing this marketplace teaches students the fundamental worth
of the intellectual autonomy and versatility of thought promoted by the First
Amendment. Constitutional academic freedom cannot support claims of
university autonomy framed to promote the exclusion of ideas from campus or
the coercion of students to act in accordance with beliefs they do not hold. Any
court should reject an interpretation of constitutional academic freedom that
directly contradicts the public policy and constitutional bases for granting this
right in the first place.
By asserting the duplicative rights of constitutional academic freedom and
the freedom of association, law schools have stated that their First Amendment
rights are greater than those of any other group. The Court, however, has never
conjoined these rights in its prior cases and, properly conceived, they are
mutually exclusive. Law schools' claim to greater institutional autonomy than
other groups thus has superficial appeal but no real substance.
The constitutional academic freedom rights of FAIR's public members are
not implicated by contravention of public universities' nondiscrimination
policies because these policies are not the product of legitimate academic
decisionmaking. Students' academic freedom rights are implicated, however,
by law schools' marginalization of students who hold differing moral, political,
and religious views. Consequently, academic freedom has an important role to
288.

Healy, 408 U.S. at 171.
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play in rejecting, rather than upholding, law schools' enforcement of moral or
political truths.
VI. Conclusion
Because the district court and the Third Circuit grounded their analysis
solely in the Supreme Court's free speech and associational case law, the
Supreme Court did not even consider FAIR's academic freedom claims. Law
schools' case against the military was a relatively easy one to resolve on free
speech and associational grounds, as the Solomon Amendment does not
significantly affect law schools' message, nor force them to accept members
they do not want. 28 9 The crucial question that remains is how courts should
analyze dissenting students' rights and these students' effect upon their
schools' institutional nondiscrimination message.
Public universities are likely to return to constitutional academic freedom
and associational rights to justify marginalization and or exclusion of student
speakers with competing moral views. 290 As a constitutional doctrine, however,
academic freedom is incapable of supporting the suppression of ideas. In fact,
constitutional academic freedom provides the answer to the pressing question
of whether public universities or these dissenting student voices should prevail.
It does this by clarifying public schools' constitutional duty to remain
unconstrained marketplaces of ideas and by elucidating the limited application
of the freedom of association to public schools.
Stretching constitutional academic freedom beyond all limits, law schools
have developed a theory of academic freedom that, in tandem with
associational rights, gives them a blank check of authority over the educational
sphere. 29 1 Law schools have only been able to effect this transformation,
289. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1309, 1312
(2006) (stating that the "military's message does not affect the law schools' speech" and that the

"Solomon Amendment does not force a law school to accept members it does not desire").
290. See Inside Higher Education, Slapped by the Supremes, http://www.inside
highered.com/news/2006/03/07/supreme (last visited June 10, 2006) (quoting Carl Monk, the
Executive Director of the Association of American Law Schools, as saying that the Supreme
Court's ruling inFAIR "undermines law schools' ability to teach and advance their own values")
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Andrew Mangino, Law School Keeps Up
Protests of JAG, YALE DAiLY NEWS, Oct. 3 2006, http://www.yaledailynews.com/
Article.aspx?ArticlelD=33540 (last visited Oct. 4, 2006) (noting that the Yale Law School
faculty voted to "press on" with its "lawsuit protesting the Solomon Amendment" despite the
Supreme Court's ruling in FAIR) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
291. Cf Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006)
("In this case, FAIR has attempted to stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines well
beyond the sort of activities these doctrines protect.").
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however, by loosing constitutional academic freedom from its public policy and
First Amendment moorings. Law schools have attempted to set constitutional
academic freedom to drift with no justification or purpose, apart from that
which they have charted for it. Thus, law schools' interpretation of institutional
academic freedom boils down to nothing less than an argument ofdeference for
deference's sake.
Few would argue that law schools' nondiscrimination policies stem from
anything but the best of intentions. Unfortunately, these good intentions have
led law schools to assert the untenable position that students' display of ideas
with which they agree is valued First Amendment protest, yet students'
demonstration of opinions which they dislike serves only to further invidious
discrimination. 9 2 If meeting with dissenting speakers in an environment that is
so openly hostile to contrasting viewpoints is not a form of First Amendment
protest, however, nothing is.
The law never grants substantial privileges unless they serve an important
public purpose. Constitutional academic freedom applies to universities that
serve society by maintaining a true marketplace of ideas. In keeping with this
goal, constitutional academic freedom is granted only to public institutions
constrained by governmental norms of ideological neutrality. Thus,
that limit their role to
constitutional academic freedom belongs to universities
2 93
teaching students "how to think, not what to think.
Historically, the focus of constitutional academic freedom has shifted to
reflect the class of individuals held in the crosshairs of governmental power.
As universities' treatment of military recruiters, religious student groups, and
others who disagree with their teachers' moral or political views amply
demonstrates, today it is students' intellectual freedoms that are primarily at
risk.294 Although academic freedom is explicitly cited in only thirty-four
292. See supra Part V.B (explaining how FAIR's nondiscrimination policy necessarily
targets students with dissenting moral views). Students who wish to interview with military
recruiters have been subject to "verbal abuse and harassment" by faculty and students and have
had their pictures posted under the caption "Face of Complicity." Supplemental Brief for
Appellants, supra note 253, at 10-11. Law schools call this "student protest." Id. at 11
293. News-Record.com, Greensboro Sit-Ins: Launch of a Civil Rights Movement,
http://www.sitins.com/keyplayers.shtmil (last visited June 10, 2006) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). This was the response of Warmoth T. Gibbs, the President
of North Carolina Agricultural and Technical University, when he was asked by city officials,
during the Civil Rights Era, to prevent students from engaging in sit-ins by keeping them on
campus.
294. See Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 2006) (showing
that public universities have denied recognized status to student groups who disagree with their
moral views); Christian Legal Society v. Kane, No. 04-04484,2005 WL 850864, at *1-2 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 12, 2005) (same); Alpha Iota Omega v. Moeser, No. Civ. 1:04CV00765, 2005 WL
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Supreme Court cases, Justices in ten of these decisions have recognized aspects
of students' academic or learning freedom.29 5 Consequently, there is no
question that students possess constitutional protection against ideological
coercion.
Lower courts' misunderstanding and disregard of constitutional academic
freedom and the impact of university action on students suggest that it is
increasingly necessary for the Supreme Court to clarify its academic freedom
case law and students' right to intellectual autonomy. Otherwise, erosion of
students' First Amendment freedoms, in the public school context, is certain to
continue. As FAIR's members have so amply demonstrated, many universities
have lost sight of the inherent value of freedom of belief and thought. It is high
time the Court reminded American universities that reverence for individual
intellectual autonomy is what the First Amendment, and thus constitutional
academic freedom, is really all about.

1720903, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2,2005) (same); see also Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F.Supp.2d 156,
172 n.20 (D. Conn. 2005) (justifying the exclusion of military recruiters by revealing that Yale
Law School banned the Christian Legal Society from using campus services when it refused to
"subscribe" to the school's nondiscrimination policy).
295. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,588 n.8 (1987) ("The dissent concludes that
the Act's purpose was to protect the academic freedom of students, and not that of teachers.
Such a view is not at odds with our conclusion .... ."); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing,
474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) ("Academic freedom thrives.., on the independent and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students.... ."); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 867-68 (1982) ("[T]his Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns
encompass the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free expression....
[S]tudents too are beneficiaries of this principle.... ."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265,312 (1978) ("Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.");
Presidents Council, District 25 v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 409 U.S. 998, 999 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The First Amendment involves not only the right to speak and publish but also the
right to hear, to learn, to know. And this Court has recognized that this right to know is
nowhere more vital than in our schools and universities .... ."); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
180 (1972) ("The College classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas' .. . ."); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969) ("[S]tate-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do
not possess absolute authority over their students."); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54,60 (1967)
("Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."); Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that academic freedom is a "special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom"); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 n.5 (1964) ("[T]he interests of the
students at the University in academic freedom are fully protected by a judgment in favor ofthe
teaching personnel ....
").

